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INTRODUCTION 
In 1952, a family of seven, the James Hill family, was held hostage 
by escaped convicts in their home in suburban Whitemarsh, Pennsyl-
vania.  The family was trapped for nineteen hours by three fugitives 
who treated them politely, made gracious chitchat with them, be-
friended the children, took their clothes and car, and left them un-
harmed.  For a few weeks, the Hills were the subjects of international 
media coverage.  Public interest eventually died out, and the Hills 
went back to their ordinary, obscure lives. 
A year and a half later, Joseph Hayes published The Desperate 
Hours, a “true crime” thriller about a family held hostage in their 
home by three escaped convicts.  The Desperate Hours was based loosely 
on the Hills’ story but substantially leavened by Hayes’ imagination.  
The novel is filled with violence and suspense; the family is subjected 
to abuse, the daughter is sexually threatened, and the father attempts 
a daring rescue.  The book became a bestseller and was made into an 
award-winning Broadway play, and later a major Hollywood film. 
In 1955, three years after the hostage incident, Life magazine ran a 
story on the opening of the play.  The article falsely described the 
play as a “reenactment” of the Hill family’s experience.1  Life used the 
Hills’ name and a picture of their home to give the piece a “newsy” 
tie to a “real life” crime.  The family was devastated by this unwanted, 
false, and embarrassing public exposure, and they successfully sued 
for invasion of privacy in the New York courts.  Life’s publisher, Time, 
Inc. appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court in 1965, arguing that the 
judgment violated the First Amendment.  The lawyer for the Hills was 
the former Vice President Richard Nixon, who had left politics and 
 
 * Associate Professor of Law, State University of New York Law School. J.D., Stanford Law 
School; Ph.D., History, University of California, Berkeley.  I would like to thank the many 
individuals who assisted me with archival research and interviews for this article, includ-
ing Alan Hruska, Donald Zoeller, Stephen Goodman, Stephen Wermiel, Suzanne Gar-
ment, and the librarians at the Manuscripts and Archives Division, Library of Congress. 
 1 True Crime Inspires Tense Play, LIFE, Feb. 28, 1955, at 75. 
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was in private legal practice at the time.2  It was the only case Nixon 
argued before the Supreme Court. 
In Time, Inc. v. Hill, the Supreme Court for the first time ad-
dressed the conflict between the right to privacy and freedom of the 
press.  The Court constitutionalized tort liability for invasion of priva-
cy, acknowledging that it raised First Amendment issues and must be 
governed by constitutional standards.  Hill substantially diminished 
privacy rights; today it is difficult if not impossible to recover against 
the press for the publication of nondefamatory private facts. 
The Hill case represented the culmination of a longstanding ten-
sion in American law and culture.  Since the early twentieth century, 
states had recognized a “right to privacy” that permitted the victims of 
unwanted, embarrassing media publicity to recover damages for emo-
tional distress.  The privacy tort was praised for offering protection 
against an exploitative press, and at the same time decried by the 
publishing industry as an infringement on its freedoms.  In the 1950s 
and 60s, with the growth of the media, an increase in privacy actions, 
and large judgments against the press, the privacy-free press conflict 
raised contentious debate. 
Privacy and free speech were charged issues in American culture 
more generally.  In an era that saw the introduction of computers, 
large-scale data collection, and increasing government surveillance, 
“privacy” emerged as a major national focus.  Free expression rights 
also assumed new meaning and urgency in the turbulent social cli-
mate of the postwar era.  These concerns were reflected in the Su-
preme Court’s decisions of this time.  In New York Times v. Sullivan, 
the most far-reaching First Amendment decision of the twentieth 
century, the Court held that the press had an expansive right to re-
port on the public conduct of public officials, including a right to 
publish falsehoods, unless they were made with “reckless disregard” 
of the truth.3  One year later, in Griswold v. Connecticut, the Court de-
clared a constitutional “right to privacy,” protected by “penumbras” 
and “emanations” of guarantees in the Bill of Rights.4 
Time, Inc. v. Hill cast these freedoms in opposition.  The case 
called upon the Warren Court, the Court that decided Sullivan and  
Griswold, to reconcile the two constitutional rights it had championed 
and created.  A majority led by Justices  Earl Warren and Abe Fortas 
initially voted to uphold the Hills’ claim.  The Hills’ constitutional 
 
 2 Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 375 (1967). 
 3 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964). 
 4 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483–85 (1965). 
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“right to be let alone” outweighed Time, Inc.’s right to publish.  But 
after a bitter fight, votes switched, and a narrow majority voted for 
Time, Inc.  In an opinion by Justice William Brennan, the Court re-
jected the notion of a constitutional right against unwanted publicity 
and declared an expansive view of the First Amendment as protection 
for all newsworthy material.  The right of the press to publish on 
“matters of public interest,” from political reporting to articles about 
Broadway plays to movies and comic books, outweighed the privacy 
interests of unwilling subjects of media publicity. 
Drawing on previously unexplored and unpublished archival pa-
pers of Richard Nixon and the Justices of the Warren Court, this Arti-
cle tells the story of this seminal constitutional law case, the Supreme 
Court’s first attempt to negotiate privacy rights and freedom of the 
press.5  It tells the story of how privacy almost won; how the Supreme 
Court almost recognized a constitutional right to privacy against the 
press—and why it didn’t.  Time, Inc. v. Hill marked a crossroads, a 
moment when the law could have gone in one of two directions:  to-
wards privacy and a measure of press restraint, or towards a freer—if 
not at times unruly and uncivil—marketplace of ideas.  The Court 
chose the latter, and we have lived with the consequences since. 
Part I describes the factual background to the case, which pitted 
an ordinary middle-class family against Time, Inc., the nation’s most 
powerful and prestigious publishing empire.  Part II examines the le-
gal backdrop—the history of tort privacy law between 1900 and the 
1950, the privacy-free press conflict, and the growth in privacy litiga-
tion after the Second World War.  Part III details the initial stages of 
the Hill litigation, and Time, Inc.’s decision to turn the lawsuit into a 
 
 5 Time, Inc. v. Hill is a standard in First Amendment casebooks, but very little has been writ-
ten about its history and significance.  The most thorough chronicler of the case was 
Leonard Garment, the lawyer for the Hills.  See LEONARD GARMENT, CRAZY RHYTHM:  MY 
JOURNEY FROM BROOKLYN, JAZZ, AND WALL STREET TO NIXON’S WHITE HOUSE, 
WATERGATE, AND BEYOND 79–97 (1997) (describing the author’s experience as plaintiff’s 
counsel); Leonard Garment, The Hill Case, THE NEW YORKER, Apr. 17, 1989, at 90–91, 94 
(detailing Richard Nixon’s interest in arguing the appeal before the Supreme Court).  
The law professor and Supreme Court historian Bernard Schwartz also had a short essay 
on the case, and the New York Times journalist Anthony Lewis included the story of the 
case in his book on the aftermath of the New York Times v. Sullivan decision.  See BERNARD 
SCHWARTZ, SUPER CHIEF:  EARL WARREN AND HIS SUPREME COURT—A JUDICIAL BIOGRAPHY 
642–48 (1983) [hereinafter SUPER CHIEF]; BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE UNPUBLISHED 
OPINIONS OF THE WARREN COURT 240–303 (1985) [hereinafter UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS]; 
see also LEE LEVINE & STEPHEN WERMIEL, THE PROGENY:  JUSTICE WILLIAM J. BRENNAN’S 
FIGHT TO PRESERVE THE LEGACY OF New York Times v. Sullivan 55–64 (2014) (illustrating 
how the Hill decision relied on the Sullivan framework); ANTHONY LEWIS, MAKE NO LAW: 
THE SULLIVAN CASE AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 184–190 (1991) (“Time, Inc. v. Hill proved 
to be the occasion for the next large step by the Court in applying the Sullivan rule.”). 
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test case that would for the first time subject the privacy tort to consti-
tutional scrutiny.  Part IV explains the cultural forces that made pri-
vacy and free speech contested issues in the 1950s and 60s.  As Part V 
suggests, Sullivan and Griswold were outgrowths of popular concerns 
with free speech and privacy, and they elevated the issues in the Hill 
case to a constitutional plane. 
Using material from Richard Nixon’s presidential archives, Part VI 
describes Time, Inc.’s appeal, and the efforts of the lawyers in the 
case to mobilize Griswold and Sullivan on behalf of their respective 
positions.  While Time, Inc.’s attorneys asked the Court to apply Sul-
livan’s “reckless disregard” standard, Nixon tried to invoke Griswold’s 
right to privacy.  Griswold was valid precedent for Hill, Nixon argued, 
because it recognized that the Bill of Rights protects personal priva-
cy.6 
Part VII, based on the Justices’ archival papers, reveals the debate 
in Hill.  Endorsing Nixon’s position, Justice Fortas, writing for the 
majority, argued that the Hills had a constitutional right to be free 
from unwanted and injurious media publicity.  Had the Fortas opin-
ion ultimately come down as law, there would have been a right to 
privacy against the press on par with Fourth Amendment privacy.  
The opinion was so bitter in its denunciation of the press that it pro-
duced a revolt led by Hugo Black, a champion of First Amendment 
absolutism and a personal enemy of Fortas.  The consequence was a 
reversal of votes and a decision in favor of Time, Inc.  The new major-
ity opinion by Justice Brennan rejected the Hills’ privacy argument 
and proclaimed Time, Inc.’s right to publish on a broad range of 
newsworthy material, even if personal privacy was sacrificed in the 
process.  It was one of the most capacious visions of freedom of the 
press in the Court’s history to that time. 
Part VIII addresses Time, Inc. v. Hill’s enduring consequences.  
Coming down at a time of heightened sensitivity to privacy, and in an 
era of press criticism, the controversial and widely publicized decision 
became a popular referendum on privacy and the press.  While the 
media celebrated Brennan, Nixon prevailed in the court of public 
opinion.  Americans had come to see the Warren Court as a defender 
of personal privacy; Hill failed that expectation and left many feeling 
disappointed and betrayed.  By largely freeing the press from tort lia-
bility for invasion of privacy, Hill emboldened it to delve deeper into 
personal affairs and private lives.  In dismissing the Hills’ privacy ar-
gument, the decision foreclosed a possibility that would have surely 
 
 6 Jurisdictional Statement at 14–15, Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967). 
510 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 18:2 
 
transformed the fate of American publishing, politics, and public dis-
course. 
There was another significant result of the case.  Nixon’s work on 
the Hill case may have helped him gain confidence to embark on a 
presidential bid in 1968.  Contemplating a return to politics, he used 
his representation of the Hills to enhance his public image—to pro-
mote himself as a principled defender of Americans’ besieged privacy 
rights.  Time, Inc. v. Hill was part of the political rebirth of Richard 
Nixon. 
PART I:  INVASION OF PRIVACY 
A.  The Hill Incident 
In the early morning hours of September 10, 1952, Joseph Wayne 
Nolen, his brother Ballard, and Elmer Schuer sawed through the 
window bars of the second floor cell they shared at the Northeastern 
Federal Penitentiary in Lewisburg, Pennsylvania.  Using a rope made 
of towels, they lowered themselves to the prison yard, then scaled the 
walls with a crude metal ladder fashioned out of pipes they’d hidden 
in the yard.  The fugitives stole a car and went to nearby Philadelphia, 
hoping to find a comfortable suburban home to break into and oc-
cupy while they ate, rested, and planned their next move.7 
James and Elizabeth Hill lived with their five children in the afflu-
ent suburb of Whitemarsh.8  Around 8:15 AM on September 11, Joe 
Nolen knocked at the back door and Elizabeth Hill answered it.  
“We’re not going to hurt you—we just want your house for a day.  If 
you do what we tell you, nobody will be hurt,” he said.  As he forced 
open the door, Ballard, Nolen and Schuer appeared with shotguns.9  
Elizabeth was taken to a second floor bedroom and locked in with 
her three sons.  The family’s two teenage daughters and the father, 
James, were not home at the time, but they returned to find the chil-
dren and Elizabeth in captivity.10 
Described by the federal judges who sentenced them as “desper-
ate” and “potential murderers,” the Nolen brothers and Elmer 
Schuer were shrewd, experienced criminals.  They were also strange-
 
 7 3 Escaped Convicts Seize Family, Hold Home 19 Hours to Elude Hunt, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 
1952, at 1. 
 8 Transcript of Record at 22, Hill v. Hayes, 15 N.Y.2d 986 (1965) [hereinafter Transcript of 
Record, Hill v. Hayes]. 
 9 House Party, TIME, Sept. 22, 1952; Transcript of Record, Hill v. Hayes, supra note 8, at 24.  
 10 Three Prison Fugitives Hold Family Captive, PHILA. BULL., Sept. 13, 1952. 
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ly, unusually polite.  They used no profanity and were courteous and 
respectful to the Hills.  They offered to play games with the children 
and to teach the boys to shoot.  They were so well-mannered that they 
even apologized for interrupting a conversation.  They were, in Eliza-
beth’s words, “perfect gentlemen.”11  Around 3:00 AM the following 
morning, the convicts finally left the house in the Hills’ car. 
Like so many victims of crime, the Hills were catapulted into the 
media spotlight. Almost all of the national newspapers covered the 
incident. The Chicago Tribune featured a huge headline:  ESCAPED 
FELONS IMPRISON FAMILY HOSTAGE 19 HOURS. 3 PRISON 
FUGITIVES HOLD FAMILY CAPTIVE 19 HOURS IN 
WHITEMARSH HOME announced the Philadelphia Bulletin.  Articles 
described the Hills’ home, the well-dressed family, the make and 
model of the family’s cars, and where the kids went to school. The lo-
cation of the house was carefully described; the papers may well have 
given out the address.  The Hills were deeply disturbed by the public-
ity, which lasted for several months.  By the spring of 1953, when the 
Hills had moved from Whitemarsh to Stamford, Connecticut, the 
media attention had finally died out.12 
B.  The Desperate Hours 
In 1953, Joseph Hayes was a struggling thirty-five-year-old free-
lance author.13  Hayes wrote scripts for radio and television as well as 
articles for national magazines.  In 1946, he had sold an article to a 
magazine about a family held hostage by criminals.  This marked the 
beginning of his interest in what he called the “hostage theme.”14 
Every time newspapers reported on a hostage incident, Hayes 
clipped the story and put it into a file folder.  By the early 1950s, the 
file was thick.  It included articles on an incident in which a burglar 
in Omaha held a woman hostage after he broke into her home.15  In 
California, three convicts went into the home of a family and forced 
the father, at gunpoint, to go into town and buy a car.  There were 
many others.  The Hills’ story captured Hayes’s attention, and he put 
the article from the New York Times into his file.16 
 
 11 Wife Describes 19 Hour Captivity, PHILA. BULL., Sept. 14, 1952. 
 12 Transcript of Record, Hill v. Hayes, supra note 8, at 44, 51. 
 13 See RAY BANTA, INDIANA’S LAUGHMAKERS 83–84 (1990); Campbell Robertson, Joseph Hayes, 
88; Wrote ‘The Desperate Hours,’ N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20, 2006, at C13. 
 14 Transcript of Record, Hill v. Hayes, supra note 8, at 85–87, 97. 
 15 Burglar Terrorizes 2 Bellevue Families, OMAHA MORNING WORLD, Oct. 2, 1947. 
 16 Transcript of Record, Hill v. Hayes, supra note 8, at 86–87, 100. 
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In the spring of 1953, Hayes had begun planning for a novel 
about a family held hostage by escaped convicts.  Using his clipping 
file for inspiration, Hayes wrote the work that became The Desperate 
Hours.  The book was published by Random House in March 1954.  
Within three weeks it landed on the bestseller list, and it stayed there 
for sixteen weeks.  It was also serialized in Collier’s magazine, excerpt-
ed in the Readers’ Digest, and published as a paperback by Pocket 
Books.  The Desperate Hours was lauded as the “hottest literary proper-
ty” of 1954.17 
The novel begins in the early dawn hours outside a federal peni-
tentiary near Indianapolis.  Three prisoners—Glenn Griffin, his 
brother Hank, and a third man, Robish—have just made a successful 
break.  Their plan was to hide out in a suburban home, selected at 
random.  The convicts choose the home of the “Hilliard” family, in a 
clean, peaceful, affluent suburb.  The fugitives arrive at the Hilliard 
home at 8:30 AM in the morning on a late summer day.  The convicts 
enter the house at gunpoint and entrap the mother; the daughter, 
son, and father return home later in the day to find Mrs. Hilliard in 
captivity.18 
The similarities between the Hills and the Hilliards are obvious, 
yet there were important differences.  Unlike the polite fugitives at 
Whitemarsh, the convicts in the novel are vulgar, profane and threat-
ening.  “Take it easy lady.  You open your mouth, the little kid who 
owns the bike out front’ll come home from school and find your 
body,” Glenn Griffin says to the mother.  Though James Hill, in real 
life, was unharmed, the father in the story, Dan Hilliard, is beaten in-
to unconsciousness.  The novel is laden with violence and sexual in-
nuendo; one of the convicts drunkenly paws the teenage daughter 
Cindy and threatens to assault her.  Despite these abuses, the family 
deals with their captors with dignity and poise.19 
In publicity pieces he wrote for the book, Hayes described the sto-
ry as an amalgam of fact and fiction, based on actual hostage inci-
dents but largely the product of his own imagination.  In an article 
titled “Fiction Out of Fact” that appeared in the Sunday New York 
Times, Hayes explained:   
 
 17 Id. 
 18 JOSEPH HAYES, THE DESPERATE HOURS 145–51 (1955). 
 19 The book received many positive reviews.  See Richard Coe, Still Exciting, Those Hours, 
WASH. POST, Nov. 10, 1955, at 38; Sterling North, Desperate Fugitive Trio Holds Family in 
Suspense, WASH. POST, Apr. 18, 1954, at B7; Orville Prescott, Books of the Times, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 3, 1954, at 25. 
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“In California, in New York State, in Detroit, in Philadelphia, 
frightened and dangerous men entered houses [and] held families 
captive in their own homes.”  “[W]hat of the personal stories in-
volved?  What are the thoughts and emotions of the guards’ waiting 
relatives?  And what of the inner struggles of the convicts them-
selves?”  The Desperate Hours sprang from “conjectures such as these.”20 
In the spring of 1954, Hayes signed a deal with the Paramount 
Studio to make The Desperate Hours into a movie.21  Hayes also made 
plans to turn the book into a play.22  The theatrical version of The Des-
perate Hours opened in New York and Philadelphia in early 1955. The 
film opened in October 1955, starring Humphrey Bogart.23 
The Hills were outraged by The Desperate Hours.  Cruelly, they were 
confronted with memories they had worked hard to put behind 
them.  James’s friends talked about The Desperate Hours, and the chil-
dren were teased.24  Every time someone asked him about The Desper-
ate Hours, James told them that the story had nothing to do with his 
experience.  “My family was not subjected to any violence.  They were 
not subjected to that type of language . . . not subjected to the possi-
bility of the women being violated.”25 
Elizabeth Hill became severely depressed.  She was humiliated 
and self-conscious; she felt as if she were being talked about and 
whispered about wherever she went.  She was descending into a psy-
chiatric breakdown—in the words of her lawyers, a “gradual retreat 
from community and family life, and the onset of an acute psychotic 
disability.”26  Things worsened in February 1955, when Life, the na-
tion’s most popular newsmagazine, with a circulation of six million, 
ran a photo essay that described the Hills—by name—as the family in 
The Desperate Hours. 
 
 20 Fiction Out of Fact, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 1955, sec. 2, at 1. 
 21 Thomas M. Pryor, New Hayes Novel Interests Bogart, N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 1954, at 36; Bob 
Thomas, Sickness of Son Directed Writer to Fame’s Door, BATON ROUGE ADVOC., Aug. 31, 
1954,at 3-A. 
 22 Louis Calta, Broadway Drama for Montgomery, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 1954, at 9. 
 23 MICHAEL ANDEREGG, WILLIAM WYLER 184 (1979); STEFAN KANFER, TOUGH WITHOUT A 
GUN 204 (2011); GABRIEL MILLER, WILLIAM WYLER:  THE LIFE AND FILMS OF HOLLYWOOD’S 
MOST CELEBRATED DIRECTOR 320 (2013); Hollis Alpert, Desperate Hours, SATURDAY 
REVIEW, Oct. 22, 1955, at 30; John McCarten, The Current Cinema, THE NEW YORKER, Oct. 
15, 1955 at 182–83. 
 24 Brief of Appellant at 12, Hill v. Hayes, 15 N.Y.2d. 986 (1965). 
 25 Id. at 46. 
 26 Transcript of Record, Hill v. Hayes, supra note 8, at 483. 
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C.  The Article 
In the 1950s, Life was America’s most popular magazine.  Life was 
part of Henry Luce’s Time, Inc. media empire, the most prestigious 
and influential publishing company of the era; Time, Inc.’s major 
publications included Time, Life and Fortune magazines.27  Half of all 
Americans over the age of ten looked at Life on a regular basis.28  In 
1954, the magazine sold a hundred million dollars worth of advertis-
ing, the largest of any publication to that time.29  Life was a trendsetter 
and tastemaker, a creator and mirror of American culture, and an 
important source of news and entertainment for the nation.  Its self-
professed mission was to educate and amuse by providing a chronicle 
of “real life”—showing people and the world “as they really are,” in all 
their splendor, curiosity, and horror.30 
The Hills’ unwanted exposure in Life began in a conversation be-
tween Hayes and Bradley Smith, a photographer who worked for 
 
 27 There is vast literature on Time, Inc.  See JAMES BAUGHMAN, HENRY LUCE AND THE RISE OF 
THE AMERICAN NEWS MEDIA 1–2, 165 (1987) (telling the story of Henry Luce’s journey to 
becoming “America’s single most powerful and innovative mass communicator” as a re-
sult of his position at the head of Time, Inc.); ALAN BRINKLEY, THE PUBLISHER:  HENRY 
LUCE AND HIS AMERICAN CENTURY 1 (2010) (describing how Luce established his maga-
zine empire); ROBERT ELSON, THE WORLD OF TIME, INC.:  THE INTIMATE HISTORY OF A 
PUBLISHING ENTERPRISE 405 (1973) (describing Life as a “trend-setter, a taste-maker, and, 
in a very special way, as an educator exploring art, nuclear fission, the world of nature”); 
ROBERT VANDERLAN, INTELLECTUALS INCORPORATED:  POLITICS, ART, AND IDEAS IN HENRY 
LUCE’S MEDIA EMPIRE 21–23, 306 (2010) (examining the tension between postwar intel-
lectuals and Luce’s vision of mass culture); Wollcott Gibbs, Time . . . Fortune . . . Life . . . 
Luce, reprinted in LIFE STORIES:  PROFILES FROM THE NEW YORKER, 79, 79–90 (David 
Remnick ed., 2000) (outlining Time, Inc.’s early struggles and successes); James Howard 
Lewis, The Saga of Time, Fortune, and Life, MAGAZINE WORLD, May 1945, at 9–10 (examin-
ing the early years of Time, Inc.). 
 28 James L. Baughman, Who Read Life?:  The Circulation of America’s Favorite Magazine, in 
LOOKING AT LIFE MAGAZINE 41–42 (Erika Doss ed., 2001). 
 29 Otha C. Spencer, Twenty Years of Life:  A Study of Time, Inc.’s Picture Magazine and Its 
Contributions to Photojournalism 275 (1958) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University 
of Missouri). 
 30 On Life magazine, see DORA JEAN HAMBLIN, THAT WAS THE LIFE 274 (1977) (discussing 
the author’s personal experiences working at Life); WENDY KOZOL, LIFE’S AMERICA:  
FAMILY AND NATION IN POSTWAR PHOTOJOURNALISM 9 (1994) (“Life explained abstract or 
complex problems, issues, or events through visual portraits of ‘real’ people.”); EDWARD 
K. THOMPSON, A LOVE AFFAIR WITH LIFE & SMITHSONIAN 40 (1995) (writing about his ex-
periences as managing editor of Life); LOUDON WAINWRIGHT, THE GREAT AMERICAN 
MAGAZINE:  AN INSIDE HISTORY OF LIFE 6 (1986) (detailing Luce’s vision for a picture 
magazine like those published in Europe); Allan C. Carlson, Luce, Life, and the “American 
Way,” reprinted in THE BEST OF THIS WORLD 384, 384 (Michael A. Scully ed., 1986) (de-
scribing the vast goals of Luce’s publication). 
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Life.31  In late 1954, Hayes and Smith were discussing how the play, 
which was about to open in Philadelphia, might be “sold” to the 
press.  Hayes told Smith that one of the hostage incidents that in-
spired The Desperate Hours had taken place in Philadelphia.  Smith 
immediately saw the publicity potential of this connection. 32 
Shortly afterwards, Smith ran into Life’s theater editor, Tom 
Prideaux, in the magazine’s New York office.33  Smith suggested that 
Life run a photo essay on the play’s opening in Philadelphia, connect-
ing it to the Hills’ captivity in 1952.34  Prideaux called Hayes and 
asked him if he was interested in having Life go to Philadelphia to 
take pictures of the cast doing scenes in the Hills’ former home.35  
Connecting the play to a real-life hostage incident would be a great 
hook for the article, Prideaux said—an “interesting gimmick” to 
make the story “newsy,” with reader appeal.36 
In January 1955, Prideaux, his research assistant, and a Life pho-
tographer went to Philadelphia to photograph the cast of the play 
performing scenes in the home at Whitemarsh.  Back at the Life of-
fice, a film editor reviewed the photographs and the best ones were 
selected for publication.37  Prideaux sat down to write the “text 
block,” the short article that would introduce the photos.  The first 
draft connected The Desperate Hours to the Hills but suggested that the 
play and novel were not an exact account of the family’s experi-
ence—The Desperate Hours was “somewhat fictionalized.” 
The article was sent to senior editor Joseph Kastner, who reviewed 
all copy before publication.38  Kastner felt that the first draft of 
Prideaux’s article, which led with a reference to Hayes, obscured the 
“newsy,” real-life connection to the Hills.  He told Prideaux to change 
the first sentence to focus on the Hills’ experience, and to include 
the family’s name.  Kastner also told Prideaux to take out the phrase 
“somewhat fictionalized,” so that the sentence read, “Hayes’ play is a 
heart-stopping account of how one family rose to heroism in a crisis.”  
 
 31 Sarah Boxer, Bradley Smith, 87, Champion of the Rights of Photographers, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 
1997, at 52. 
 32 Letter from Bradley Smith to A.J. Malino, Box 3, Folder 1 (n.d.), contained in Hayes Col-
lection, Box 10, Folder 3, Lilly Library Manuscript Collections, Indiana University. 
 33 N.M. Goodwin, The Desperate Hours Story, HARTFORD COURANT, July 3, 1955. 
 34 Transcript of Record, Hill v. Hayes, supra note 8, at 180, 192; Bradley Smith to A.J. 
Malino, Feb. 26, 1957, in Hayes Collection, Box 10, Folder 3, Lilly Library Manuscript 
Collections, Indiana University. 
 35 Transcript of Record, Hill v. Hayes, supra note 8, at 122. 
 36 Id. at 180. 
 37 Id. at 128. 
 38 WAINWRIGHT, supra note 30, at 239. 
516 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 18:2 
 
Prideaux had initially written that the Hill incident “sparked off” the 
book.  In the new version, the novel was “inspired” by it.  The revised 
version also said that the Hills’ story was “re-enacted” in the play.  The 
result of Kastner’s edits was to depict The Desperate Hours as a near-
faithful portrayal of the Hills’ experience. 39 
The three-page photo essay, titled “TRUE CRIME INSPIRES 
TENSE PLAY,” with the subtitle, “The ordeal of a family trapped by 
convicts gives Broadway a new thriller, ‘The Desperate Hours,’” ran in 
the Life issue dated February 28, 1955. 
Three years ago Americans all over the country read about the desperate 
ordeal of the James Hill family, who were held prisoners in their home 
outside Philadelphia by three escaped convicts. Later they read about it 
in Joseph Hayes’s novel, The Desperate Hours, inspired by the family’s ex-
perience. Now they can see the story re-enacted in Hayes’s Broadway play 
based on the book . . . . 
The play . . . is a heart-stopping account of how a family rose to heroism 
in a crisis. LIFE photographed the play during its Philadelphia tryout, 
transported some of the actors to the actual house where the Hills were 
besieged. On the next page scenes from the play are re-enacted on the 
site of the crime. 
At the top of the first page ran a photograph of the Hills’ former 
home and a headline from the September 12, 1952 Philadelphia Daily 
News, “BANK ROBBERS HOLD FAMILY IN WHITEMARSH 
PRISONERS,” underscored by the caption “Actual event, as reported 
in newspaper, took place in isolated house about 10 miles from Phil-
adelphia.  There three convicts from Lewisburg penitentiary held 
family of James Hill as prisoners while they hid from manhunt. All 
three convicts were later captured.”40  It wasn’t false to say there was a 
connection between the Hills and the play and that the Hills’ story 
had “inspired” The Desperate Hours.  But “re-enactment” was a serious 
exaggeration, perhaps even an outright lie.  Even a cursory reading of 
The Desperate Hours, the news articles from September 1952, and 
Hayes’ own, published musings on his creative process would have re-
vealed that the story didn’t “reenact” the Hills’ experience.  The use 
of the picture of the Hills’ former home, the newspaper headline, 
and the family’s name to publicize the play was perhaps Life’s greatest 
sin.  The opening of The Desperate Hours could have been reported 
without any mention of the Hills whatsoever. 
The Hills, who subscribed to Life, received the issue shortly after 
its publication.  Stunned, they looked at the article repeatedly, get-
 
 39 Transcript of Record, Hill v. Hayes, supra note 8, at 239. 
 40 True Crime Inspires Tense Play, LIFE, Feb. 25, 1955, at 75. 
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ting angrier every time.  “We couldn’t understand how [Life] could 
do that just for the sake of some free publicity,” James Hill recalled:  
“We certainly couldn’t understand how Life could publish an article such 
as this without first checking the newspapers or at least picking up a tele-
phone to find out whether this was the truth or how we felt about it.  It 
was just like we didn’t exist, like we were dirt, like they didn’t care.”41 
James called Bob Guthrie, an old friend who was working as a 
partner at a prestigious Wall Street law firm, Mudge, Stern, Baldwin, 
and Todd.  He told Guthrie he was interested in bringing suit against 
Life, presumably for libel.  A white-shoe firm like Mudge generally 
didn’t take tort cases; the firm represented the country’s largest and 
most prestigious companies in high-profile corporate matters.  But 
Guthrie made an exception for his friend, whom he agreed to repre-
sent on a contingent fee basis.42 
Guthrie assigned the case to Leonard Garment, a thiry-one-year-
old associate and graduate of Brooklyn Law School who would later 
become head of the litigation department at Mudge and in the 1970s, 
Richard Nixon’s counsel in the Watergate affair. Garment was in-
trigued by the Hill case, which became a “fascinating diversion” for 
him—“a kind of adventure in lawyering” outside the commercial 
practice he was used to.43 
Garment’s first step was to attempt to avert a lawsuit by asking Life 
to publish a retraction.  He sought a notice, printed in a subsequent 
issue, explaining that it had made a mistake connecting the Hills to 
The Desperate Hours.  Predictably, Life’s editors refused Garment’s re-
quest.44  Life’s flippant response outraged the Hills, and Garment ini-
tiated legal proceedings.45 
It soon became apparent that a suit for libel was not an option.  
Libel requires that a statement be both false and defamatory; that it 
expose a person to “hatred” or “contempt,” “injure him in his profes-
sion or trade, [and] cause him to be shunned or avoided by his 
neighbors.”46  While the Life article may have upset and embarrassed 
the Hills, it did not defame the family.  To the contrary, it presented 
 
 41 Transcript of Record, Hill v. Hayes, supra note 8, at 232. 
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the Hills in a positive, flattering light—as noble and heroic.  With li-
bel foreclosed, Garment investigated the possibility of a suit for inva-
sion of privacy under New York law. 
II.  THE LAW OF PRIVACY 
In most states by the 1950s, people could sue for “invasion of pri-
vacy” and recover damages for emotional distress when their pictures 
or private facts were publicized in a humiliating, offensive manner.  
According to the Restatement of Torts, “a person who unreasonably and 
seriously interferes with another’s interest in not having his affairs 
known to others or his likeness exhibited to the public is liable to the 
other.”47  By 1960 an invasion of privacy tort was “declared to exist by 
the overwhelming majority of American courts.”48 
From its inception the privacy tort had been controversial.  While 
there was often great sympathy for individuals unwillingly thrust into 
the media spotlight, some argued that liability for the publication of 
nondefamatory facts, however personal or embarrassing those facts 
might be, was an infringement on freedom of the press.  The Hill 
case became part of that ongoing debate. 
A.  The Origins of The Privacy Tort 
The privacy tort was a response to the rise of mass publishing in 
the late nineteenth century.  Between 1870 and 1900, advances in 
printing technology, rising literacy rates, and expanding urban popu-
lations led to an outpouring of printed material.  Newspapers and 
magazines had begun to feature “human-interest” stories as well as 
gossip columns, filled with details of private life.49  The disclosure of 
personal facts in the press sometimes led to serious emotional inju-
ries.  A man whose clandestine marriage was exposed in a gossip col-
umn “elaborated . . . with sensational details,” was so distraught by 
“the sudden gaze of a whole community” that he committed suicide.50  
A man committed crimes in his youth and went on to become a re-
spectable member of his community.  A newspaper “amplified the 
story” of his past life in “sensational style” and the man died under 
the stress of the exposure.51  Because the material was true, there 
 
 47 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS  § 867. 
 48 William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 382, 389 (1960). 
 49 See Helen MacGill Hughes, The Social Interpretation of News, 219 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & 
SOC. SCI. 11, 12–14 (1942) (citations omitted). 
 50 Newspaper Brutality, CHRISTIAN UNION, Dec. 5, 1889, at 708. 
 51 Id. 
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could be no action for libel, and this gap in the law became the sub-
ject of criticism and proposals for reform. 
In the famous 1890 Harvard Law Review article “The Right to Pri-
vacy,” the Boston lawyers Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis accused 
the press of “overstepping in every direction the obvious bounds of 
propriety and of decency.”52  “[P]ersons with whose affairs the com-
munity has no legitimate concerns” were “being dragged into an un-
desirable and undesired publicity.”53  Having one’s personal details 
publicized in a newspaper caused embarrassment and “mental pain 
and distress, far greater than could be inflicted by mere bodily inju-
ry.”54  They proposed a “right to privacy,” a cause of action under the 
common law that would allow the victims of “invasions of privacy”—
humiliating publicity of one’s image or personal facts—to sue and re-
cover monetary damages for mental anguish.55  Unlike libel, the tort 
of invasion of privacy did not protect a person’s reputation, but one’s 
right to control his public persona: his right “of determining . . . to 
what extent his thoughts, sentiments, and emotions shall be commu-
nicated to others.”56 
The scope of liability was broad, but there would be a safe harbor 
for the press.  The publication of “matters of public and general in-
terest” would be privileged, Warren and Brandeis proposed.57  Such 
matters concerned the public interest, in the sense of the public wel-
fare or common good, such as serious news about politics, or the 
public activities of public leaders.58  Mere trivia and gossip, though 
perhaps interesting, were not “matters of public interest.”59  By the 
early twentieth century, several states had approved a tort of invasion 
of privacy under the common law or by statute.60 
The privacy tort was relatively unproblematic under reigning free 
speech doctrines.  In the late nineteenth century it was generally 
agreed that the right of free speech precluded prior restraints but 
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permitted the punishment of publications for their “bad tendency,” 
their propensity to create moral harm or violence and unrest.61  Inso-
far as gossip and salacious depictions of private life injured people 
and degraded society’s moral fabric, they had a “bad tendency.” 
Yet some forward-looking commentators suggested that liability 
for publishing truthful facts could infringe on freedom of speech.  
Newspapers might be forced to pay damages for publishing photo-
graphs that their subjects found displeasing.  Politicians and public 
officials could potentially use their “right to privacy” to quash truthful 
criticism or suppress reports of misdeeds or corruption.62  In an 1893 
case, the wife of a deceased, famous inventor brought suit against the 
publisher of an unauthorized biography of her late husband, claim-
ing an invasion of privacy.  The court rejected the claim, concluding 
that imposing liability for the publication of a public figure’s life story 
would be a “remarkable exception to liberty of the press.”63 
B.  The Simultaneous Expansion and Contraction of Privacy 
By the 1940s the privacy tort had been recognized in at least fif-
teen jurisdictions.  Courts offered relief to individuals who had been 
humiliated, misrepresented, or otherwise offended by unwanted me-
dia exposure.64  In 1926, a woman named Louise Peed was found un-
conscious in an apartment, the victim of a “carelessly closed gas jet.”  
The Washington Times published a picture of Peed along with a story 
about the accident.  She was embarrassed, and she sued the newspa-
per for invasion of privacy; the defendant’s motion to dismiss was re-
jected.  The court mocked the newspaper’s efforts to invoke freedom 
of the press as a defense: that liberty did not carry with it the “privi-
lege of invading any…right of the citizen,” including one’s right to 
keep one’s misfortunes out of the papers.65 
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At the same time privacy law was expanding, however, courts were 
widening its privileges in response to changes in First Amendment 
law.  In a series of cases in the 1930s and 40s, the Supreme Court 
eliminated the “bad tendency” rule.  The mere “tendency” of speech 
to create harm was no longer enough to justify its prohibition.  For 
the government to curtail speech, it had to show that the expression 
was “of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger” of seri-
ous harm.  The advocacy of unpopular political, moral, or religious 
views did not by itself rise to the level of serious harm.66  Government 
abridgements of speech were henceforth viewed under a strict scruti-
ny standard.  Because free expression was “the matrix, the indispen-
sable condition, of nearly every . . . form of freedom,” as the Court 
wrote in 1937, freedom of speech occupied a preferred position in 
the scheme of constitutional liberties, and state actions restricting 
speech could not stand unless justified by a compelling government 
interest beyond mere disagreement with the views espoused.67 
In Near v. Minnesota,68 the Court struck down a Minnesota state 
nuisance law that prohibited the publication of a “malicious, scandal-
ous, and defamatory newspaper, magazine or other periodical.”69  
The statute was aimed at the distribution of matter “detrimental to 
public morals and to the general welfare,” “tending to disturb the 
peace of the community” and to provoke “assaults and the commis-
sion of crime.”70  The Court characterized the law as “the essence of 
censorship” and noted the importance of a “vigilant and courageous 
press” that would expose the abuses of corrupt governments and “un-
faithful officials.”71  In Near, the Court included freedom of the press 
as one the liberties incorporated through the Fourteenth Amend-
ment and made applicable to the states.72 
In the 1940s, some courts began to reject the narrow, Warren and 
Brandeis view of what constituted a privileged “matter of public in-
terest.”  That view, as will be recalled, was a normative one: what was a 
matter of “public concern” or “public interest” was not what actually 
interested the public, but rather what judges believed that the public 
should know, in its own best interest.  In the new model, “matters of 
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public interest” was a descriptive term:  if material attracted the pub-
lic’s attention or interest, it was a “matter of public interest.”73  A re-
port of a child custody proceeding, newsreel footage of an overweight 
woman in an exercise course, embarrassing material in a gossip col-
umn, and a dramatized radio broadcast about a man’s mysterious dis-
appearance were all deemed to be “matters of public interest” or 
newsworthy material.74 
Because there was great curiosity in public figures’ private lives, 
their personal affairs were “matters of public interest,” according to 
some courts.75  The law of privacy had always been more solicitous of 
ordinary people than public figures, but some courts were now claim-
ing that even private citizens waived their right to privacy when they 
became involved, willingly or unwillingly, in “matters of public inter-
est.”76  The victims of accidents and crimes had no right to privacy, in-
sofar as those events were newsworthy.77  As the Second Circuit Court 
of Appeals noted in an important 1940 privacy decision, Sidis v. F-R. 
Publishing, involving a reclusive child genius who sued over unwanted 
publicity in The New Yorker, “regrettably or not, the misfortunes and 
frailties of neighbors and public figures” were subjects of interest to 
the public, “[a]nd when such are the mores of the community it 
would be unwise for a court to bar their expression in the newspa-
pers, books, and magazines of the day.”78 
The objective of the broad newsworthiness or “matters of public 
interest” standard was to get courts out of the business of making val-
ue judgments about the worth of publications.  The judicial creation 
of a definition of news or “matters of public interest” that overrode 
the media’s publishing decisions and the public’s consumption 
choices was seen by some as an impermissible form of censorship.  As 
with libel, the privacy tort did not raise a formal First Amendment is-
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sue; tort liability was not yet considered to be state action.79  Courts 
nonetheless described the newsworthiness or “public interest” privi-
lege as important protection for freedom of the press.  As a New York 
trial court noted in the 1937 case Lahiri v. Daily Mirror, a right of pri-
vacy that imposed liability for “news items and articles of general pub-
lic interest, educational and informative in character,” implicated the 
rights of a “free press.”80 
In 1903 New York had created a privacy law by statute.81  Unlike 
the common law tort, New York’s privacy law specifically targeted the 
unauthorized use of people’s identities for commercial purposes.82  
Civil Rights Law Sections 50 and 51, titled the “Right of Privacy,” pe-
nalized the unauthorized use of a person’s “name, portrait, or pic-
ture” for “advertising” or for “trade” uses.83  Section 50 made the vio-
lation a misdemeanor; Section 51 granted the right to sue for an 
injunction and compensatory and punitive damages.  Damages were 
awarded for emotional distress.84 
The courts of New York, the center of the publishing industry, 
were among the most protective of the press in the country.  Almost 
immediately after the passage of the privacy statute, the state’s courts 
made it clear that in the interest in freedom of the press, the use of 
names, portraits, and likenesses in the news did not fall under the 
prohibition of “trade” uses.85  Although the New York courts never 
said exactly what the news was, they made clear that it extended be-
yond straight factual reporting on politics, public affairs, and other 
traditional news items to gossip and sensationalistic journalism. 
The plaintiff in the 1914 case Colyer v. Fox86 was a professional high 
diver who had her photograph taken in costume.87  A copy came into 
the possession of the National Police Gazette, a disreputable, bawdy 
men’s magazine.88  The woman claimed that the Police Gazette was not 
a serious news publication and therefore publishing her photograph 
was actionable as a “trade” use.89  The court rejected the argument, 
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noting that “[a]pplied as the appellant would desire, [the statute] 
would cover nearly every issue of our newspapers, and especially our 
great number of monthly magazines.”90 
New York’s expansive definition of news, and narrow definition of 
“trade,” did not give the press carte blanche to publish people’s pic-
tures, names, and life stories, however.  What about a case where a 
news article was falsified?  Newspapers of the time were not above 
“faking” stories—concocting so-called news items from whole cloth.  
Would a faked article merit the same protections as truthful news? 
The New York Herald published an article allegedly written by a 
man named D’Altomonte, a member of the Italian nobility, “a profes-
sional newspaper correspondent, traveler, writer, and lecturer of rec-
ognized ability, commanding several languages.”91  The article, about 
African travel, was published under D’Altomonte’s name, but the no-
bleman did not write it.92  The article, he alleged, was silly and ridicu-
lous; although not defamatory, it made him look foolish and unedu-
cated.93  He sued under the privacy statute.94  The court held that the 
article was an actionable “trade” publication.  A falsified or fictional-
ized publication could not be privileged as news.95 
C.  A Haystack in a Hurricane 
During the 1950s the number of reported privacy cases more than 
doubled that of any previous decade.96  The increase tracked the 
growth of the media in the postwar era.  Newspaper circulation 
reached historic highs; by 1960, there were 1.3 newspapers per Amer-
ican.97  Book sales in the U.S. increased by 450%.98  The new medium 
of television was introduced, and by 1952 over 18,000 television sets 
were in use.99  By 1960 there were more than 300 reported privacy 
cases, and the tort of privacy had been recognized in a majority of 
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states.100  “How many more [privacy cases] are settled in lower courts 
or out of court cannot even be estimated,” observed a major journal-
ism trade publication.101  “The number of cases can be said to be def-
initely increasing.”102 
In an era when tort liability was expanding more generally, courts 
found invasions of privacy in all manner of depictions plaintiffs found 
to be embarrassing, offensive, or otherwise injurious to their sense of 
self.  A California trial court issued a $290,000 judgment against the 
film company Loew’s Inc, over a complaint by a woman who was the 
model for an Army nurse in the film They Were Expendable.103  The 
court concluded that depicting her romance with a Navy lieutenant 
on screen was an invasion of her privacy and not justified by the pub-
lic’s interest in “news.”104  In 1952, when a commercial flight devel-
oped engine trouble, a Navy commander on board helped land the 
plane.105  A televised dramatization of the incident, altering the de-
tails, portrayed him foolishly: “praying during the course of [the] 
emergency landing . . . wearing a so-called Hawaiian shirt . . . [and] 
repeatedly . . . smoking a pipe and cigarettes.”106  A federal court de-
termined that a jury could potentially find in the distorted broadcast 
an “offensive invasion of privacy.”107  Yet at the same time, some courts 
were interpreting the “newsworthiness” and “matters of public inter-
est” privileges liberally.  Stories about a politician’s home and family 
life, a sensationalistic article about a homicide in Official Detective Sto-
ries magazine, images of car accident victims—however crass, invasive 
or trivial, these publications were “newsworthy” and exempt from lia-
bility for invasion of privacy, insofar as they served the public’s inter-
est in being informed.108 
In the 1950s privacy law had reached a crossroads.  State rules var-
ied considerably, and the law’s uncertainty had become a major prob-
lem for the publishing industry, which faced growing litigation, un-
predictable outcomes, and at times, substantial verdicts.  A federal 
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judge described the unsettled state of the law as akin to a “haystack in 
a hurricane.”109  This was the backdrop against which the Hills 
brought their case. 
III.  HILL V. HAYES 
In October 1955, Leonard Garment filed a complaint on behalf of 
James and Elizabeth Hill under the New York privacy statute, seeking 
damages for emotional distress.110  Connecticut, where the Hills resid-
ed, had not recognized the privacy tort, and James Hill’s employment 
in New York City, and the circulation of the publication in New York, 
was sufficient to establish New York jurisdiction.111  The suit was 
against Time, Inc. and Joseph Hayes.112  The Life article, Garment al-
leged, was an invasion of the Hills’ privacy—an unauthorized use of 
their identities in a publication that was false and fictionalized.113 
To be clear, what the Hills were most outraged by was their un-
wanted exposure to the public gaze.  They were angry that Life had 
presented them falsely, but even more upset by the fact that the mag-
azine had rehashed their misfortune over two years later.  Under the 
New York privacy case law, however, the mere fact of being publicized 
would not have been actionable, since the Hills had become “news-
worthy” by virtue of being victims of a crime.  Garment therefore had 
to hinge the Hills’ claim on the falsity of the publication, which ren-
dered it “non-newsworthy” under New York law. 
The “Life magazine article of February 28, 1955 was intended to, 
and actually did convey the impression that the plaintiffs Hill and 
their children were the family . . . depicted in the novel, play and mo-
 
109 Ettore v. Philco Television Broad., 229 F.2d 481, 485 (3d Cir. 1956). 
110 The claim was initially against every party involved in the “creation, publication, and dis-
semination of the book, play, and movie The Desperate Hours,” as well as the Life article—
Joseph Hayes, Time Inc., Paramount Pictures, Random House, The Literary Guild, Crow-
ell-Collier Book Publishing, Pocket Books, and the Readers’ Digest Association.  The ar-
gument was that the publication of the novel, the production of the play and the film, 
and the Life article were invasions of the Hills’ privacy—unauthorized uses of their identi-
ties that were false and for commercial purposes. In May 1956, the lawyers for Random 
House and Pocket Books moved to dismiss the claim on the ground that a “novel based 
upon real life incidents and characters” did not violate the New York privacy law. The trial 
court granted the motion; because the Hills were not specifically identified in the book, 
there was no violation of the statute, which prohibited the use of the “name, portrait or 
picture” of the plaintiff.  Hill v. Hayes, 155 N.Y.S.2d 234, 235 (N.Y. App. Div. 1956). 
111 Hill v. Hayes, 207 N.Y.S.2d 901, 903–04 (N.Y. App. Div. 1960). 
112 Id. at 901. 
113 Complaint at 434, Hill v. Hayes, 155 N.Y.S.2d 234 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1956).  The complaint is 
part of the Trial Record on appeal (207 N.E.2d 604). 
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tion picture The Desperate Hours,” read the complaint.114  The use of 
the Hills’ identities in Life magazine was primarily for “advertising”—
a scheme to increase the magazine’s circulation by “falsely and sensa-
tionally” linking the play to the family.115  There was no legitimate rea-
son “as a matter of news dissemination or otherwise, to identify the 
plaintiffs Hill with the Hilliard family.”116  Garment believed that 
Hayes was complicit in the article, that he “collaborated with and 
made it possible for defendant Time, Inc. to prepare and publish said 
article” as a publicity scheme for the play. 117 
The depositions had demonstrated, in Garment’s view, that Life 
intentionally falsified the connection between the Hills and The Desper-
ate Hours.  Garment’s examination of Life editor Tom Prideaux re-
vealed that Prideaux linked the Hills and the play as a “gimmick,” a 
ploy to make the article interesting and sensational, even though 
there was evidence that Prideaux knew The Desperate Hours was not re-
ally a “reenactment” of the Hill incident.118  Concluding that the arti-
cle was a deliberate, intentional, even malicious distortion of the 
truth, Garment sought punitive damages.  The Hills asked for what 
was then the extraordinary sum of $900,000 from Hayes and Time, 
Inc.—$100,000 actual and $200,000 punitive damages for James Hill, 
and $200,000 actual and $400,000 punitive damages for Elizabeth 
Hill.119 
A.  The Defense 
Time, Inc.’s lawyers were unfazed by Garment’s legal overtures.  
Every year about two to three hundred readers threatened to sue 
Time, Inc. for libel or invasion of privacy.120  Most who sued didn’t 
win.121  Like many major publishing companies, Time, Inc. was repre-
 
114 Third Amended Complaint at 11, Hill v. Hayes, 13 A.D.2d 954 (N.Y.App. Div. 1961). 
115 Id. at 12. 
116 Complaint at 431, Hill v. Hayes, 155 N.Y.S.2d 234 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1956). 
117 The complaint alleged that “Hayes had knowledge . . . that defendant Time, Inc., intend-
ed to identify the plaintiffs Hill and their children as the specific family portrayed in The 
Desperate Hours, and nevertheless . . . thereafter collaborated with and made it possible for 
defendant Time, Inc. to prepare and publish said article.”  Third Amended Complaint, 
supra note 114, at 12. 
118 Reply Brief for the Appellant at 374, Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967). 
119 Third Amended Complaint, supra note 114, at 8–17.  Hayes’s lawyer wrote to his client 
with alarm, saying that “the action always had a serious aspect to it but it is becoming ex-
tremely complex and cumbersome.”  Nonetheless, he assured Hayes, “[W]e have an ex-
cellent chance to lick this case.”  Letter from Berman to Hayes (May 8, 1958), in Hayes 
Collection, Box 10, Folder 3, Lilly Library Manuscript Collections, Indiana University. 
120 JOHN KOBLER, LUCE:  HIS TIME, LIFE, AND FORTUNE 158 (1968). 
121 Id. 
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sented by the nation’s best and most expensive legal talent.  As pub-
lishing became a large-scale corporate enterprise, publishers could 
afford to hire the most skilled advocates.  Elite firms like Sullivan and 
Cromwell; Kirkland and Ellis; Weil, Gotshal and Manges; and Lord, 
Day & Lord represented media outlets like the Chicago Tribune, the 
New York Times, and the publishing houses Scribner’s and Random 
House.122 
The Wall Street firm Cravath, Swaine, and Moore had represented 
Time, Inc. since 1926.123  Cravath assisted the company with a variety 
of issues related to its business and printing operations as well as 
problems stemming from its publications.124  As the firm’s history not-
ed, “the lively, breezy style of all the Time, Inc. publications has natu-
rally led to many scores of suits and threatened suits for alleged libel 
and invasion of the right of privacy.”125  Time, Inc. also had its own in-
house counsel that worked closely with Cravath’s lawyers.126 
For many years, the Cravath litigating department boasted that it 
had never lost a single libel or privacy case.127  As of 1948, only three 
libel cases had been lost, in two of which only nominal damages were 
awarded.128  In the 1940s the notorious Bruce Bromley was trial coun-
sel for Time, Inc.’s libel and privacy cases.129  Bromley, who later be-
came a New York state judge, was infamous for his “hardball” tactics, 
including exhausting the opposition by filing motion after motion 
and dragging out the simplest cases “almost to infinity.”130  The lawyer 
who represented Time, Inc. in the Hill case was Harold Medina, Jr., a 
Columbia Law graduate and a well-known attorney specializing in 
media issues; Medina’s father, Harold Medina Sr., was a noted judge 
 
122 On Lord, Day & Lord, see generally KERMIT L. HALL & MELVIN I. UROFSKY, NEW YORK 
TIMES V. SULLIVAN:  CIVIL RIGHTS, LIBEL LAW, AND THE FREE PRESS (2011); on Kirkland 
and Ellis and the Chicago Tribune, see generally Eric B. Easton, The Colonel’s Finest Cam-
paign:  Robert R. McCormick and Near v. Minnesota, 60 FED. COMM. L.J. 183 (2008). 
123 See [II] ROBERT T. SWAINE, THE CRAVATH FIRM AND ITS PREDECESSORS 1819–1948, at 611–
16 (1948) (noting that Cravath’s stable of business clients included media giants:  the 
Curtis company, publishers of the Saturday Evening Post; the Philadelphia Inquirer; Look 
magazine; Esquire, and the Washington Post, along with Time, Inc. were its most prominent 
publishing clients). 
124 Id. 
125 Id. at 613. 
126 See THOMPSON, supra note 30, at 142 (explaining that while the Cravath team handled the 
actual court work, Time, Inc.’s in-house lawyers regularly provided Cravath’s lawyers with 
an appreciation of the risks involved in its litigation strategy). 
127 SWAINE, supra note 123, at 614. 
128 Id.at 614 n.2. 
129 Id. at 613–14. 
130 David Margolick, The Law;  At The Bar, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 1988, http://www.nytimes.com
/1988/05/20/us/the-law-at-the-bar.html?pagewanted=print. 
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on the Second Circuit Court of Appeals.131  By the 1960s, Medina had 
successfully represented Time, Inc. in dozens of libel and privacy cas-
es.132 
Historically, libel had been a major threat to the press, and it re-
mained so. Media lawyers in the 1950s and 60s were also concerned 
with liability for invasion of privacy.  The law of privacy was far less 
developed than libel law, which had a set of elaborate and well-
defined privileges and defenses that protected the press, such as the 
“fair comment” and fair report privileges, and the defense of truth.133 
Privacy law had no such protections.  As the law of privacy stood in 
the 1950s, in some states, a plaintiff could potentially recover for a 
true, nondefamatory statement if a court deemed the material to be 
not newsworthy or a “matter of public concern,” a vague and ill-
defined standard.134  Also troubling to media lawyers was the emerg-
ing tort of “false light” privacy, which paralleled New York’s statutory 
privacy.  Under the false light tort, plaintiffs could recover for false, 
fictionalized, or misleading publications that were nondefamatory 
but emotionally distressing.135  Plaintiffs who were offended by media 
publications could circumvent libel law and recover under the less 
stringent rules of privacy—and many were doing exactly that.136 
In the Hill case, Time, Inc.’s lawyers mobilized the familiar news-
worthiness defense.  “The Life article was a subject of legitimate news 
interest,” they argued.137  The story connected two newsworthy events, 
the opening of the play and the Hill incident.  The piece in Life was 
in “every respect a subject of general interest and of value and con-
cern to the public at the time of its publication.”138  Both the debut of 
The Desperate Hours and the Hills’ victimization by the escaped con-
victs were important events of “public concern.”139 
Time, Inc. contended that the story was in no way false or fiction-
alized because the connection between The Desperate Hours and the 
Hills’ incident was essentially true.  Time, Inc.’s lawyers created a dia-
 
131 Glenn Fowler, H.R. Medina, Jr., 78, Lawyer and Expert in Libel and Privacy, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 
20, 1991, at D23. 
132 See, e.g., Berkson v. Time, Inc., 187 N.Y.S.2d 849 (N.Y. App. Div. 1959); Curtis v. Time, 
Inc., 251 F.2d 389 (D.C. Cir. 1958); Green v. Time, Inc., 143 N.E.2d 517 (1957); Time, 
Inc. v. Hartmann, 334 U.S. 838 (1948). 
133 See Comment, Developments in the Law of Defamation, 69 HARV. L. R. 875, 925–33 (1956) 
(describing the privileges and defenses to defamation causes of action). 
134 See, e.g., Leverton v. Curtis Publ’g, 97 F. Supp. 181, 182 (E.D. Pa. 1951). 
135 Prosser, supra note 48, at 398–401. 
136 Id. at 401. 
137 Answer of Defendant Time, Inc., Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967). 
138 Id. 
139 Id. 
530 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 18:2 
 
gram, what they described as a “parallel column display,” that listed 
side by side the similarities between The Desperate Hours and the Hills’ 
experience.140  Among them:  “Mr. Hilliard, a man in his early forties.  
Mr. Hill, a man in his early forties.  Mrs. Hilliard, an attractive woman 
in her early forties.  Mrs. Hill, an attractive woman in her early forties.  
A teenage daughter (on both sides).  The play had a ten year old son; 
the real-life incident had an eleven-year old son.”141  “Both incidents, 
the real and the fictional, took place at approximately 8:30 am, in an 
isolated suburb of a large city.”142  Although The Desperate Hours was 
obviously not a precise reenactment of the Hills’ ordeal, the article was 
“accurate” because the play was, more or less, about the Hills.143 
The trial court rejected Time, Inc.’s motion for summary judg-
ment, concluding that there were significant questions as to whether 
the Life article was true or fictionalized and that the case should be 
sent to trial to resolve the issue.144  The judge thought that the Life ar-
ticle seemed like an intentional fabrication, a “piece of commercial 
fiction.”145  Time, Inc. appealed, and on June 27, 1961, the Appellate 
Division, First Department affirmed the lower court. 146 
B.  Trial 
In April 1962, nearly six years after it had begun, the Hill case 
proceeded to trial before the New York State Supreme Court in 
Manhattan.  Leonard Garment argued that the Life article was inten-
tionally falsified and could not be newsworthy under New York law.147  
“We didn’t lie . . . we acted in good faith,” Medina told the jury.  “We 
reported a newsworthy event, and . . . we . . . are entitled to be 
cleared of these lies against us.”148 
The legal arguments mattered in this contentious trial, but the 
emotional strategies were equally if not more important.  And here 
the Hills’ lawyers had the upper hand.  As Garment recalled, 
Both I and my calmly competent trial assistant, Don Zoeller . . . saw what 
our job was.  We knew the judge and jury might well wonder why the 
Hills were so bothered by Life’s article. . . .  [So] we saw that we had to get 
 
140 See Brief of Appellant at 37–38, Hill v. Hayes, 15 N.Y.2d. 986 (1965). 
141 Id. at 38. 
142 Id. at 37. 
143 Brief of Appellant, Hill v. Hayes, 13 A.D.2d 954 (1961). 
144 Hill v. Hayes, 207 N.Y.S.2d 901, 904 (N.Y. App. Div. 1960). 
145 Id. at 903. 
146 Hill v. Hayes, 216 N.Y.S.2d 497 (N.Y. App. Div. 1961). 
147 Transcript of Record at 461–73, Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967) [hereinafter Tran-
script of Record, Time, Inc v. Hill]. 
148 Id. at 467. 
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the jury as angry as we were at Time, Inc. . . . [W]e bet our case on the 
theme of ice-cold institutional indifference.149 
Garment announced that this would be an important case in 
which free press interests would be rolled back in the name of privacy 
rights.  “The press issue that will be drawn into focus by the evidence 
involves the abuse of the freedom of the press by one of the nation’s 
great publishing institutions.”150  He further stated:  
We charge Time Inc. with having published a false article, falsely drag-
ging the plaintiffs into the news, falsely linking them with a violent, mel-
odramatic work of fiction for commercial purposes . . . We charge this 
most powerful of all news publications in the world with having done this 
deliberately, with knowledge of falsity . . . . [I]n order for this case to have 
any meaning . . . you must render a verdict in the only terms that this de-
fendant understands, and that is in terms of a substantial award of puni-
tive damages . . . . It must be an award of punitive damages that is heard 
not only in this courtroom but in every editorial room throughout the 
country.  You must award punitive damages in an amount that shocks the 
newspaper industry.151 
Playing on public animus against the press was a shrewd tactic; na-
tional polls and studies found “public criticism and disapproval” of 
journalists for intrusive newsgathering and “invasions of privacy.”152 
Garment skillfully portrayed Life editor Tom Prideaux as aloof, ar-
rogant and callous.  Knowing full well that the Hills were not the 
“Hilliards,” Prideaux and his fellow editors nonetheless made that 
claim in the article, according to Garment.  Prideaux came off as 
snide and condescending.153  As Garment recalled in his memoirs, “In 
perhaps the trial’s crowning moment of journalistic insensitivity, 
Prideaux testified that since there was a ‘connection’ between the 
Hill incident and The Desperate Hours, Life felt ‘it was an obligatory 
thing to do, to point out this connection.’  And that, kiddies, is the 
kind of unguarded hubris that produces chillingly large punitive 
damage verdicts against the press.”154 
Medical witnesses testified to the severe harm that the Life article 
had caused Mrs. Hill.  According to Stanley Dean, Mrs. Hill’s psychia-
trist, Elizabeth was a vision of “extreme depression and gloom,” ex-
 
149 GARMENT, supra note 5, at 81. 
150 Trial Memorandum, at 4, undated, Wilderness Years Collection (on file with the Nixon 
Presidential Library). 
151 Transcript of Record, Time, Inc. v. Hill, supra note 147, at 565. 
152 Ignaz Rothenberg, Invasions of Privacy in the Codes of Journalists, NIEMAN REPORTS Oct. 
1959 at 5. 
153 GARMENT, supra note 5, at 82. 
154 Id. 
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pressing “feelings of abject hopelessness . . . [and] uselessness.”155  
Dean diagnosed her with “severe reactive depression of psychotic 
proportions” caused by publicity in Life.156  Elizabeth was receiving 
electroshock treatments and going to therapy three times a week.157 
After five hours, the jury entered a verdict in favor of Joseph 
Hayes.158  Although Hayes had made arrangements with Prideaux for 
the article and had helped facilitate the photoshoot, it was clear that 
he had nothing to do with the content or production of the Life arti-
cle.159  The jury found against Time, Inc., concluding that Life inten-
tionally used the Hills’ name and identity falsely, and that because of 
the intentional falsification punitive damages were justified.160  They 
awarded these extraordinarily sympathetic plaintiffs $175,000—
$75,000 compensatory damages to Elizabeth Hill and $50,000 for 
James Hill, and $25,000 in punitive damages to each.161  It was the 
largest invasion of privacy judgment in history.162 
C.  Appeal 
The decision shocked the publishing world.  “Traditionally, 
newsmen have assumed that stories about a legitimate news event, 
presented in legitimate fashion, do not constitute invasion of priva-
cy,” Newsweek observed shortly after the decision.163  Life’s story 
“seemed harmless enough when Life [ran] it, but last week a New 
York . . . jury ruled that the Life article had exposed Mr. and Mrs. Hill, 
who had not consented to the Life story, to illegal invasion of priva-
cy.”164  The size of the award was alarming.165  With decisions like the 
one in Hill, “New York as the center of the publishing industry will 
not remain long.”166 
 
155 Transcript of Record, Time, Inc. v. Hill, supra note 147, at 490. 
156 Id. 
157 Id. at 491. 
158 Id. at 334–36. 
159 Id. 
160 Id. 
161 Transcript of Record, Hill v. Hayes, supra note 8, at 6; see also GARMENT, supra note 5, at 
82. 
162 GARMENT, supra note 5, at 82. 
163 Critical Question, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 30, 1962, at 60. 
164 Id. 
165 E.g., Barber v. Time, Inc., 159 S.W.2d 291, 296 (Mo. 1942) (entering judgment for actual 
damages in the amount of $1,500). 
166 Brief of Appellant at 118, Hill v. Hayes, 18 A.D.2d 485 (N.Y. App. Div. 1963). 
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In 1963 Time, Inc.’s lawyers appealed to the state’s intermediate 
court.167  Medina now admitted that there were errors in Life’s report-
ing but insisted that they were incidental and negligent, a product of 
hasty reporting, inevitable in the fast-paced publishing world.  The 
trial judge had told the jury that it was to determine whether Life had 
“altered or changed the true facts concerning plaintiffs’ relationship 
to The Desperate Hours, so that the article . . . constituted . . .  a fiction-
alized version . . . to amuse, thrill, astonish or move the reading pub-
lic so as to increase the circulation of the magazine.”168  If the instruc-
tion were correct—that any alteration of true facts, however benign 
or slight, rendered material fictionalized and unprotected by the 
news privilege—“the guaranty of a free press would be emasculated,” 
Medina argued.169  “Should Time, Inc. be required to pay $175,000 in 
damages because it said it ‘reenacted’ . . . when it should have said 
‘based,’ or ‘inspired’ when it should have said ‘triggered’?” he asked.  
“The day that judgments in a right of privacy action can be upheld on 
semantic distinctions of that illusory nature is the day that a free press 
becomes a thing of the past.”170 
In May 1963 the appeals court affirmed Time Inc.’s liability, 
though it remanded the case for a retrial on damages, which it 
deemed excessive.171  Judge Bernard Botein, a noted free speech ad-
vocate, dissented; though there were inaccuracies in the article, its 
overall gist was true and “newsworthy,” he argued.172  “Can it be said 
that [the] flaws are of so extravagant a nature as to convert into fic-
tion an informative presentation of legitimate news?  In my opinion 
not; we are in a domain where ‘the lines may not be drawn so tight as 
to imperil more than we protect.’”173  The new trial on damages yield-
ed $30,000 in compensatory damages for James Hill.174  Garment, 
concerned that the Hills would go empty-handed in the event of a 
successful appeal, had settled with the publisher for $60,000 on Mrs. 
Hill’s claim.175 
 
167 Hill v. Hayes, 18 A.D.2d 485, 486 (N.Y. App. Div. 1963). 
168 Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 394–95 (1967). 
169 Brief of Appellant at 118, Hill v. Hayes, 18 A.D.2d 485 (N.Y. App. Div. 1963). 
170 Id. at 56. 
171 Hill, 18 A.D. 2d at 490. 
172 Id. at 492–93 (Botein, P.J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted); see also Bernard 
Botein, Book Review, 67 HARV. L. REV. 920, 922 (1954) (reviewing HAROLD L. CROSS, THE 
PEOPLE’S RIGHT TO KNOW.  LEGAL ACCESS TO PUBLIC RECORDS AND PROCEEDINGS (1953)) 
(stressing the importance of freedom of the press in court proceedings). 
173 Hill, 18 A.D. 2d at 493 (Botein, P.J., dissenting). 
174 Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 417 (1967). 
175 Memorandum from Leonard Garment to Richard Nixon, Wilderness Years Collection 
(May 28, 1967) (on file with the Nixon Presidential Library). 
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Time, Inc.’s publisher and top editors were deeply troubled by the 
case.176  The judgment brought out how devastating privacy law could 
be to the publishing industry.  Hill was turning into a crucial piece of 
litigation, one that Time, Inc. was willing to pursue to the fullest, irre-
spective of expense, to clarify the law of privacy and establish im-
portant precedent.  Time, Inc. v. Hill had become a test case.177 
IV.  PRIVACY AND FREE SPEECH 
To understand what happened next in Time, Inc. v. Hill, we need 
to understand its social context.  In the 1950s and 60s, historical exi-
gencies pushed privacy and free speech to the forefront of popular 
consciousness.  Amidst the turbulence and social change of the post-
war era, Americans were discovering the importance of privacy and 
also embracing the virtues of free expression. 
After the Second World War, America became an affluent society.  
The gross national product increased about 250%, and the median 
family income almost doubled.178  White-collar career opportunities 
multiplied with the expansion of corporations, and in 1956, for the 
first time, the number of white-collar jobs outnumbered blue-collar 
jobs.179  Prosperity birthed a rising sense of individual possibility 
among the middle class.180  In a nation that had triumphed in the war 
and that had achieved an unprecedented standard of living, there was 
a feeling of “limitless hopes and . . . opportunities.”181  In this individ-
ual-centered, rights-oriented society, privacy and free expression were 
both cast as critical personal rights.  Both were aspects of the freedom 
and autonomy that were being described as the essence of democracy 
and the American Dream of self-enhancement, self-transformation, 
and self-determination.182 
 
176 See THOMPSON, supra note 30, at 143. 
177 Id. 
178 DAVID FARBER, THE AGE OF GREAT DREAMS: AMERICA IN THE 1960S, at 8 (1994). 
179 WINI BREINES, YOUNG, WHITE, AND MISERABLE: GROWING UP FEMALE IN THE FIFTIES 4 
(1992). 
180 FARBER, supra note 178, at 64–65. 
181 Id. at 17. 
182 See BREINES, supra note 179 at 2–6 (“[T]here was a pleased consensus that America was 
the richest and most successful nation on earth.”); see generally HOWARD BRICK, AGE OF 
CONTRADICTION: AMERICAN THOUGHT AND CULTURE IN THE 1950S (1998) (discussing the 
changes in American life throughout the 1950s); ELAINE TYLER MAY, HOMEWARD BOUND: 
AMERICAN FAMILIES IN THE COLD WAR ERA (1988) (detailing the American response to 
political insecurities through the lens of privacy and security); DOUGLAS T. MILLER & 
MARION NOWAK, THE FIFTIES:  THE WAY WE REALLY WERE (1975) (surveying the cultural 
and political history of the United States during the 1950s). 
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A.  Privacy 
Although Americans had long been concerned with privacy, the 
issue became a major national focus after the Second World War.183  
Privacy concerns were aired in an “astonishing variety of locations,” 
ranging from journalistic exposes to television programs, law review 
articles, films, Supreme Court decisions, poems, novels, and autobi-
ographies, writes privacy scholar Deborah Nelson.184  A “privacy pan-
ic” ensued as many feared the erosion of their privacy at the hands of 
the government, the media, and private industry.185 
The technological developments of World War II had yielded a 
host of new devices that could penetrate privacy.  As U.S. News and 
World Report noted in 1955, “cigarette-pack-size transmitter[s] operat-
ed by battery, hidden in a room or car” could “beam conversations to 
receivers a quarter of a mile away,” “parabolic microphones . . . could 
pick up conversations 300 miles away,” and “wire recorder[s] hidden 
in a briefcase or pocket” were being used with “tiny, concealed mi-
crophones” known as “‘bugs.’”186  Beginning in the early 1950s there 
was a major public dialogue around wiretapping as journalistic and 
government investigations uncovered the extent of the practice.187  
With the use and popularization of surveillance devices in the grow-
ing private detective industry, by the government, retail stores, and 
among the general public, “people are beginning to wonder whether 
personal privacy is a thing of the past.”188 
Population growth, geographic mobility in the automobile age, 
the rise of consumer credit, and the expansion of social services cre-
ated the need for public and private institutions to monitor and track 
 
183 On Americans’ historical concerns with privacy, see FREDERICK S. LANE, AMERICAN 
PRIVACY:  THE 400-YEAR HISTORY OF OUR MOST CONTESTED RIGHT 153 (2009) (recounting 
the history of the American public’s interest in privacy rights). 
184 DEBORAH NELSON, PURSUING PRIVACY IN POSTWAR AMERICA xiv (2002). 
185 See Samantha Barbas, Saving Privacy from History, 61 DEPAUL L. REV. 973, 1021–22 (2012) 
(tracking privacy concerns post World War II). 
186 Gadgets with Big Ears, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Apr. 22, 1955, at 46–48. 
187 See, e.g., David Boroff, No Place to Hide, SATURDAY REV., Mar. 21, 1964, at 47 (reviewing 
VANCE PACKARD, THE NAKED SOCIETY (1964) and MYRON BRENTON, PRIVACY INVADERS 
(1964), two books discussing invasion of privacy); Vance Packard, The Walls Do Have Ears, 
N. Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, Sept. 20, 1964, at 23 (discussing wire taps as a threat to privacy); 
Bernard Spindel & Bill Davidson, Who Else is Listening, COLLIER’S, June 10, 1955, at 25 
(explaining the history of eavesdropping via wiretap). 
188 David L. Cohn, A Businessman Under Every Bed, SATURDAY REV., July 15, 1950, at 15–16 (de-
scribing the use of surveillance devices to collect data by businesses). 
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individuals.189  Large private and governmental investigative systems 
were devoted to amassing personal dossiers on millions.190  Material 
was obtained through “personal interviews, lie-detector tests, wiretap-
ping, electronic bugging and even, in some rare cases, by the use of 
truth drugs,” noted Life magazine in a piece titled “What Happened 
to Our Privacy?”191  The compilation of these files was aided by com-
puters, which had recently come into use.  Wrote Alan Westin in his 
1967 work Privacy and Freedom, consulting these dossiers “has become 
the method by which a large organization makes judgments about 
people when it wants to hire or fire them, lend them money, or give 
them passports to travel abroad.”192  Social scientists were discussing 
the possibility of keeping central files of standardized photographs of 
the entire population.193  “And, of course, these photographs will be 
in the nude,” predicted anthropologist Ashley Montagu in 1956.  
“Thus will the last of our privacies be stripped from us.” 194 
The media’s invasions of privacy had become more pervasive and 
nefarious.  Reporters were said to be using wiretaps and surreptitious 
recording devices, closed-circuit television and other miniaturized 
cameras, in addition to climbing fire escapes and posing “as detec-
tives, coroners’ assistants, or other public or semi-public officials to 
gain access to places from which they otherwise would be barred.”195  
Critics lamented the trend towards “thrust[ing] a microphone under 
the chin of a woman who has watched her child being injured and 
urg[ing] her to tell the viewers how she feels.”196  One commentator 
noted NBC’s “remorseless focusing” on sustained close-ups of bleed-
ing corpses and incidents in which the family members of murder vic-
tims were pursued and assaulted by television reporters.197  “Public 
opinion, in growing degree, angrily reacts to violations of privacy by 
journalists,” noted one media critic.198 
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Privacy was a matter of concern because of the growing threats to 
it; it was also becoming more of an issue because people had more of 
it, and felt more entitled to it.  America was becoming, in a sense, a 
“privatized” society, and the focus of American life was turning in-
ward.  In the middle-class ethos of the time, success and fulfillment 
were not to be found in public life and civic involvement, as they 
once had been, but in the world of the personal, intimate, and do-
mestic—one’s family, home, relationships, and material posses-
sions.199  As people spent more time enjoying the fruits of national af-
fluence—in their cars and their new suburban homes, in their living 
rooms watching television, amassing personal possessions—the pri-
vate life had become the “good life.”  In a society where relative seclu-
sion and limited engagement in public life had become a reality for 
millions, privacy was a value seen as especially crucial and worth pro-
tecting. 
Privacy was not just the right to be “let alone.”  “Privacy” was de-
scribed as a sweeping right to personal autonomy, a right that seemed 
fragile and evanescent in a standardized mass society dominated by 
large, impersonal business and government institutions.  The essence 
of privacy was the protection of personal “independence,” wrote law 
professor Edward Bloustein in 1965, and invasions of privacy, whether 
by the government or the media, were a serious offense to “the right 
of the individual to be self-determining. . . .”200  Privacy was the indi-
vidual’s “rightful claim . . . to determine the extent to which he wish-
es to share himself with others. . . .”201  The right “to deter-
mine . . . when, how, and to what extent information about [oneself] 
is communicated to others” was an essential instrument for achieving 
individual “freedom.”202 
B.  Free Expression 
At the same time American culture was embracing privacy, it was 
becoming sensitive to the value of free expression.  Like the right to 
privacy, freedom of personal expression was bound up with the au-
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tonomy, growth and enhancement of the individual.  As one legal 
scholar observed in 1963, free expression—self-expression—was es-
sential to personal authenticity and “self-realization.”203  Memoirs, talk 
show confessions, and other genres of self-exposure became staples of 
popular culture;204 various political, social, and lifestyle movements, 
from the feminist movement to the antiwar movement to the coun-
terculture, turned self-expression into a form of rebellion, a political 
statement, and even a fashionable style.205 
Freedom of speech became a rallying cry in the emerging culture 
of political protest and dissent.  In the 1950s, McCarthyism, the 
House Un-American Activities Committee, and the postwar Red Scare 
had made dissenting, “subversive” expression a crime, and this bred a 
political backlash.206  In the early 1960s, a student free speech move-
ment began, protesting universities’ efforts to quash expression on 
campus.207  Free expression became a contested issue in the civil 
rights movement, as Southern authorities used violence to quash 
pickets, sit-ins, and other public protests.208  By the end of the 1960s, 
mass demonstrations against the Vietnam War occupied the streets, 
spawning violent acts of retribution.209  Political criticism was de-
scribed as a “public duty.”210  Despite widespread concerns with media 
invasions of privacy, the crusading, muckraking journalist, risking his 
life to expose official abuse and corruption, was romanticized in the 
popular culture of the time.211 
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The Supreme Court’s decisions reflected these concerns.  Be-
tween the end of World War II and the 1970s the Court reviewed 
more free speech cases than in the entire history of the Constitu-
tion.212  The issues reflected the fractured cultural climate—the Court 
heard cases on the speech rights of accused communists, the right to 
engage in sexually explicit speech, and the right to protest in public 
places, among other topics.  The Supreme Court under Earl Warren 
pioneered a number of modern speech-protecting doctrines, includ-
ing freedom of association, academic freedom, the right to receive 
information and ideas, the public forum, and vagueness and 
overbreadth.213  The Court “brought whole categories of expression 
within the ambit of the free speech clause for the first time—
expression that had historically been assumed to be beyond the pale 
of constitutional protection,” writes Nadine Strossen.214  “More con-
sistently than other Courts before or since, the Warren Court ap-
proached free speech questions from the perspective that freedom of 
expression is a preferred constitutional value.”215 
V.  SULLIVAN, GRISWOLD, AND NIXON 
In March 1964, the Supreme Court handed down its landmark 
decision in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.216  In Sullivan, the Court 
constitutionalized and restricted the law of libel, noting the “chilling 
effect” of defamation judgments on news publishing and free expres-
sion.217  Only a year later, in Griswold v. Connecticut,218 the Court recog-
nized a general right to privacy in the Constitution. By elevating its 
issues to a constitutional plane, these decisions transformed the Hill 
case. 
A.  Sullivan 
New York Times v. Sullivan grew out of the violence of the civil 
rights struggle.  L.B. Sullivan, an elected city commissioner of Mont-
gomery, Alabama who supervised the police department, brought suit 
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against the New York Times (“Times”), claiming that he had been li-
beled by a full-page advertisement in the Times, created by a civil 
rights group, depicting violence against blacks by the Montgomery 
police.219  The ad contained a few minor errors, and the Times had 
published it without checking its accuracy.220  An Alabama trial court 
held that there had been a libel and the Alabama Supreme Court af-
firmed a judgment of half a million dollars against the Times.221 
In a 9-0 decision for the Times, written by Justice William Brennan, 
the Court reversed the judgment on First Amendment grounds.222  
Under the common law, libel had been a strict liability tort.223  It was 
also based on a presumption of falsity—a defamatory statement was 
assumed to be false unless the defendant proved it true.224  Eliminat-
ing the strict liability rule in cases involving libels of public officials, 
the Court announced that criticism of public officials containing er-
rors of fact was protected under the Constitution provided the errors 
were not made with “actual malice”—”reckless disregard” of the 
truth.225 
“[E]rroneous statement is inevitable in free debate, and . . . must 
be protected if the freedoms of expression are to have the ‘breathing 
space’ that they ‘need . . . to survive,’” Brennan wrote.226  Newspapers 
would cease reporting on controversial issues if careless errors 
opened them up to liability.  The presumption of falsity also bur-
dened the right to engage in political criticism.  “Under such a rule, 
would-be critics of official conduct may be deterred from voicing 
their criticism, even though it is believed to be true and even though 
it is in fact true, because of doubt whether it can be proved in court 
or fear of the expense of having to do so.”227  Brennan described the 
common law rules of civil libel as akin to crime of seditious libel, an 
unconstitutional relic of the 18th century.228  The public’s right to 
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freely criticize its leaders, Brennan concluded, was the “central mean-
ing” of the First Amendment.229 
Sullivan constitutionalized the law of libel.230  The Court rejected 
Sullivan’s claim that the First and Fourteenth Amendments did not 
apply to a state libel judgment.231  “[L]ibel can claim no talismanic 
immunity from constitutional limitations.  It must be measured by 
standards that satisfy the First Amendment.”232  After Sullivan, public 
officials suing for libel over statements about their official conduct 
had to prove that the statement was false and published with reckless 
disregard of the truth.  The Court constitutionalized a common law 
privilege that had been recognized in some states and that was most 
clearly enunciated in a 1908 Kansas decision, Coleman v. MacLen-
nan.233 
Brennan, appointed to the Court in 1956, was a formerly obscure 
New Jersey Supreme Court justice who became arguably the most 
important intellectual influence on the Warren Court.234  Brennan 
was the only member of the Court’s “liberal majority capable of act-
ing as principal doctrinalist, and he may have been the only one to 
care about theory and doctrine,” note historians Kermit Hall and 
Melvin Urofsky.235  Even before Sullivan, Brennan was a staunch de-
fender of freedom of speech.236  In 1958, at the height of the Red 
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Scare, the Court heard Speiser v. Randall,237 involving a state law re-
quiring a veteran to show that he had not advocated the overthrow of 
government as a condition for receiving government benefits.  Put-
ting the burden of proof on the applicant, Brennan concluded, had a 
“chilling effect” on speech— “ the man who knows that he must bring 
forth proof and persuade another of the lawfulness of his conduct 
necessarily must steer far wider of the unlawful zone than if the State 
must bear these burdens.”238  “First Amendment freedoms need 
breathing space to survive,” he wrote.239 
Brennan’s Sullivan opinion was influenced by the political theorist 
Alexander Meiklejohn, who believed that the purpose of the First 
Amendment was to safeguard “public discussions of public issues” for 
the purpose of democratic self-government.240  Meiklejohn defined 
speech on public issues, or speech of “governing importance,” broad-
ly; it incorporated a wide range of material including philosophy, art, 
literature, and entertainment.241  Within this area, protections were 
absolute.242  Libelous speech about private citizens, obscenities, or in-
citement—“shouting fire in a crowded theater”—were “private 
speech,” not relevant to public discourse and unprotected by the First 
Amendment.243 
In Sullivan, Brennan described speech on public affairs—
specifically, politics and political criticism—as the core of the First 
Amendment.244  This was narrower than Meiklejohn’s domain. Even 
within this realm, free speech protections were qualified.  Unlike 
Meikeljohn, Brennan thought that some speech on “governing mat-
ters” could be restricted; the state’s interest in protecting personal 
reputation, even the reputations of public figures, was not to be dis-
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regarded.245  While Meiklejohn would have done away with liability for 
libels of public officials, Sullivan limited recovery but did not elimi-
nate it.  As Hall and Urofsky write, Brennan embraced “a technique 
of conceding in principle the government’s power to pursue its ob-
jective, while at the same time making it extraordinarily difficult [for 
the government] to do so.”246 
Per the parlance of the day, Brennan was a First Amendment 
“balancer.”  The Supreme Court’s free speech jurisprudence in the 
1960s was marked by a debate between absolutists, who took the First 
Amendment’s guarantees as unqualified, and balancers, who weighed 
the interest in free expression against the government’s interests in 
restricting speech.247  “Ad hoc” balancers weighed the interests in free 
expression in any given case against the social interest sought by the 
regulation restricting expression.248  “Definitional balancers” put 
speech into categories and genres, then weighed the worth of the 
category against the state’s interest in restricting it.249  Definitional 
balancers employed balancing “not for the purpose of determining 
which litigant deserves to prevail in the particular case, but only for 
the purpose of defining which forms of speech are to be regarded as 
‘speech’ within the meaning of the first amendment,” in the words of 
law professor Melville Nimmer.250  Brennan employed definitional 
balancing in Sullivan, concluding that libels on public officials were 
unprotected if made with reckless disregard of the truth.251 
Hugo Black was the most outspoken proponent of First Amend-
ment absolutism.252  Black, a former Senator from Alabama appointed 
to the Court in 1937, described the Constitution as his “legal bi-
ble. . . . I cherish every word of it, from the first to the last, and I per-
sonally deplore even the slightest deviation from its least important 
commands.” 253  “Nothing that I have read in the Congressional de-
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bates on the Bill of Rights indicates that there was any belief that the 
First Amendment contained any qualifications.”254  He had “no 
doubt” that liability for libel was unconstitutional.255  Black wrote a 
concurrence in Sullivan, joined by Justice William O. Douglas, also an 
absolutist, in which he agreed with the Court’s reversal of the judg-
ment but rejected the actual malice standard.  The Times had an “ab-
solute, unconditional constitutional right to publish . . . criticisms of 
the Montgomery agencies and officials,” Black argued.256  “We would, 
I think, more faithfully interpret the First Amendment by holding 
that at the very least it leaves the people and the press free to criticize 
officials and discuss public affairs with impunity.”257 
Within weeks of the Sullivan decision, Time, Inc. appealed the Hill 
case to New York’s highest court, arguing that “the decision appealed 
from is in violation of constitutional guaranties of free press and free 
speech.”258  “As recently stated by the Supreme Court in New York 
Times v. Sullivan, erroneous statement is inevitable in free debate 
and . . . it must be protected if the freedoms of expression are to have 
the breathing space that they need to survive.”259  Mere factual error 
alone “affords no warrant for repressing speech that would otherwise 
be free.”260  In April 1965, in a per curiam decision, the Court of Ap-
peals affirmed the judgment against Time, Inc.261 
Time, Inc.’s lawyers immediately announced their intent to appeal 
to the U.S. Supreme Court, challenging both the publisher’s liability 
and the constitutionality of the New York statute under the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments.262  The publishing industry eagerly watched 
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the case.  “The question of the extent to which the newly expanded 
right of privacy “inhibits robust and wide open” debate on “public is-
sues” would inevitably come before the Court, predicted Publishers’ 
Weekly.  Until then, “authors and publishers will have to continue to 
walk a tightrope as far as privacy is concerned.”263 
B.  Griswold 
Only two months after Time, Inc. filed its appeal, the Court issued 
its decision in Griswold v. Connecticut.264  In June 1965, seven members 
of the Court, in an opinion by Douglas, invalidated an antiquated 
Connecticut law forbidding the use and dissemination of birth con-
trol as a violation of a newly-articulated constitutional “right to priva-
cy.”265 
The Griswold decision reflected the sense of urgency around pri-
vacy in 1964–65.  In addition to magazine and newspaper articles and 
television documentaries, several books on the issue appeared, in-
cluding Myron Brenton’s The Privacy Invaders and Vance Packard’s 
The Naked Society.266  Exposés warned the public “to wake up not only 
to the tapped wires and hidden microphones that may be probing in-
to our lives, but to various subtler invasions being conducted by big 
government, big business, big curiosity, and big fun, as in the “Can-
did Camera” show.”267  That year a Federal Data Center was proposed 
that would amass extensive files on every citizen.  “The implications 
of such[] [a] proposal shocks the sensibilities of thinking Americans,” 
noted one editorial.268  “In our modern age, with all of its intrusive 
impacts on the individual, traditional concepts of a man’s right to 
privacy are . . . becoming increasingly undermined.”269 
The word “privacy” did not appear in the Constitution, although 
the Warren Court had recognized a “right to privacy” under different 
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provisions of the Bill of Rights.  In Mapp v. Ohio,270 the Court referred 
to the “freedom from unconscionable invasions of privacy”—
unwarranted searches and seizures—as protected by the Fourth 
Amendment.271  The Court recognized a right to “associational priva-
cy” under the First Amendment in cases involving forced disclosures 
of group membership lists.272  Prior to the start of Warren’s term in 
1953, the term “privacy” appeared in just eighty-eight Supreme Court 
opinions.273  The term appeared in 107 opinions during Warren’s fif-
teen-year tenure.274 
Justice Douglas’s opinion in Griswold conceded that there was no 
specifically enumerated “right to privacy” but spoke of “zones of pri-
vacy” created by various guarantees of the Bill of Rights.275 “Specific 
guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emana-
tions from those guarantees that help give them life and substance.”276  
In addition to the Fourth Amendment, the Fifth Amendment pro-
tected citizens against “governmental invasions ‘of the . . . privacies of 
life.’”277  The Third Amendment’s prohibition against the quartering 
of soldiers without consent was another aspect of constitutionally pro-
tected privacy.278  The First Amendment protected the “privacy” of 
one’s political associations, and also the “freedom of in-
quiry . . . thought, and freedom to teach”—intellectual privacy.279  
Douglas concluded that the Connecticut statute infringed upon a 
right to privacy—a right to “marital privacy,” a form of “associational 
privacy”—contained within the “penumbral emanations” of “several 
fundamental constitutional guarantees.”280  “We deal with a right of 
privacy older than the Bill of Rights . . . .  Marriage is a coming to-
gether for better or for worse . . . it is an association for as noble a 
purpose as any involved in our prior decisions.”281 
 
270 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
271 Id. at 657. 
272 Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 485–86 (1960) (holding that an Arkansas statute requir-
ing teachers to disclose every organization to which they belonged unconstitutionally im-
paired teachers’ freedom to associate); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958) 
(“Inviolability of privacy in group association may in many circumstances be indispensa-
ble to preservation of freedom of association . . . .”). 
273 LANE, supra note 183, at 153. 
274 Id. 
275 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,484–85 (1965). 
276 Id. 
277 Id. (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886)). 
278 Id. at 484. 
279 Id. at 482–83 (citations omitted). 
280 Id. at 484–86. 
281 Id. at 486. 
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Just as Sullivan agitated the debate between absolutists and bal-
ancers, Griswold fueled the dispute over “incorporation”—which 
guarantees of the Bill of Rights were made applicable to the states 
through the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and 
whether the due process clause protected ‘fundamental rights’ not 
specifically elaborated in the Bill of Rights.  Douglas’s opinion sug-
gested that the Fourteenth Amendment protects only the rights 
guaranteed by the letter or the ‘penumbras’ of the Bill of Rights.282  
Arthur Goldberg’s concurrence, joined by Warren and Brennan, 
agreed that the Connecticut birth-control statute intruded upon the 
right of “marital privacy” but described privacy as a right protected by 
the due process clause.283  Concurring, John Marshall Harlan and By-
ron White also rested their case on the due process clause.284 
Black, dissenting, denied the existence of a right to privacy in the 
Bill of Rights.  An outgrowth of his constitutional literalism, he re-
jected the Court’s attempt to formulate rights not founded in specific 
constitutional guarantees.285  As he wrote in Griswold, 
I get nowhere in this case by talk about a constitutional ‘right of privacy’ 
as an emanation from one or more constitutional provisions.  I like my 
privacy as well as the next one, but I am nevertheless compelled to admit 
that government has a right to invade it unless prohibited by some specif-
ic constitutional provision.286 
The due process argument claimed for the judiciary the “power to in-
validate any legislative act which the judges find irrational, unreason-
able or offensive.”287  In a footnote, Black accused Douglas of attempt-
ing to elevate the tort of privacy into a constitutional doctrine: 
[T]his Court, which I did not understand to have power to sit as a court 
of common law, now appears to be exalting a phrase which Warren and 
Brandeis used in discussing grounds for tort relief, to the level of a con-
 
282 Id. at 484–86. 
283 Id. at 486 (Goldberg, J., concurring). 
284 Id. at 449 (Harlan J., concurring); id. at 502 (White J., concurring); see also JOHN W. 
JOHNSON, GRISWOLD V. CONNECTICUT:  BIRTH CONTROL AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT 
OF PRIVACY (2005) (giving a general exposition of the issues addressed in Griswold); Paul 
G. Kauper, Penumbras, Peripheries, Emanations, Things Fundamental and Things Forgotten:  The 
Griswold Case, 64 MICH. L. REV. 235 (1965) (explaining that Harlan and White found the 
Connecticut statute unconstitutional on the grounds that it violated the due process 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
285 In his dissent in Adamson v. California, he had argued that the Fourteenth Amendment 
made all of the Bill of Rights applicable to the states and that there was no basis for a ju-
dicial formulation of any other fundamental rights.  This was his “total incorporation” 
concept.  332 U.S. 46, 74–75 (1947) (Black J., dissenting). 
286 Griswold, 381 U.S. at 509–10 (Black, J., dissenting). 
287 Id. at 511. 
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stitutional rule which prevents state legislatures from passing any law 
deemed by this Court to interfere with ‘privacy.’288 
Griswold, like Sullivan, was a popular decision.  A survey showed 
that most Americans thought the “decision was correct in viewing pri-
vacy as a right that [was] fundamental to their way of life.”289  The 
vague Douglas opinion left critical legal questions unanswered, how-
ever.  Did the new right to privacy extend beyond “marital privacy”?  
In which constitutional provisions did it reside?  Which government 
interests, if any, trumped the right to privacy?  The significance of 
Griswold for the Hills’ lawyers was that it elevated “privacy” to the sta-
tus of a general constitutional right.  The conflict between privacy 
and freedom of the press could now be framed as a clash between two 
constitutional values. 
D.  Nixon 
It was around this time that Richard Nixon became involved with 
the Hill case.  In 1963, the former Vice President joined the Mudge 
law firm, which subsequently renamed itself Nixon, Mudge, Rose, 
Guthrie, and Alexander.290  Nixon had served as Vice-President for 
two terms under Eisenhower in the 1950s, unsuccessfully ran for pres-
ident against John F. Kennedy in 1960, and failed in his attempt to 
become California’s governor in 1962. He blamed these losses, in 
part, on the press.  In 1962, after losing the governor’s race, he gave 
what he called his “last press conference.”291  The press had hounded 
Nixon since the beginning of his political life in the 1940s.292  Nixon 
accused the press of torpedoing his career and announced that he 
was leaving politics and that the press wouldn’t have “Nixon to kick 
around anymore.”293  This spiteful attack was a public relations disas-
ter; “barring a miracle,” said Time magazine, Nixon’s political career 
was over.294 
Nixon then sought to reinvent himself as a corporate lawyer. Nix-
on had attended Duke Law School and had practiced law briefly be-
 
288 Id. at 510 n.1 (1965). 
289 WESTIN, supra note 192, at 355. 
290 JONATHAN AITKEN, NIXON:  A LIFE 363–64 (1993). 
291 RICHARD NIXON, SPEECHES, WRITINGS, DOCUMENTS 112 (Rick Perlstein, ed., 2008). 
292 John Aloysius Farrell, When Nixon Met the Press, POLITICO.COM, Aug. 6, 2014, 
http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/08/nixon-and-the-media-109773. 
293 NIXON, supra note 291, at 112. 
294 Id. at xxxvi. 
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fore entering politics.295  Through connections, Nixon was introduced 
to the head of Mudge and brought into the organization as a “public 
partner,” to drum up business for the then-declining firm.296  Nixon 
joined Mudge because he needed to make money, and also because 
he felt that the firm could serve as a launching pad for his ongoing 
political ambitions.297  Nixon sought to return to politics, perhaps 
even to make a run for the presidency, but he was unsure whether he 
could rehabilitate his tarnished public image.298  Leonard Garment 
and several other lawyers at Mudge became part of an impromptu 
campaign team for Nixon beginning in 1964.299  The law firm was 
sympathetic to Nixon’s aspirations and gave him plenty of time for 
his political activities.300 
In 1965 and 1966, Nixon flew around the country campaigning 
for Republican candidates, gave lectures worldwide, and tried to es-
tablish the base for a return to politics.301  At the same time, he took 
his law work seriously.  Writes biographer Stephen Ambrose, Nixon 
went at his law job “the way he went after political office, aggressively, 
with an equal emphasis on hard work and personal contacts.”  “Nixon 
the corporate lawyer was as instant a success as he had been as Nixon 
the politician. . . . In the short period he spent as an active lawyer, 
Nixon demonstrated that he could have reached the pinnacle in cor-
porate law practice as well as in politics.”302  Nixon described his time 
in New York as his “Wilderness Years,” in which he fought for his po-
litical reincarnation.  Observes biographer Jonathan Aitken,  “the key 
elements in that fight were achieving professional success in the legal 
world . . . exercising astute judgment to position himself in the centre 
 
295 STEPHEN E. AMBROSE, 2 NIXON:  THE TRIUMPH OF A POLITICIAN, 1962–1972, at 73–84, 87–
91, (1989). 
296 The move was covered widely in the press.  See, e.g., Nixon is Reported Joining Firm Here, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 2, 1963, at 1, 25 (reporting on Nixon’s planned move to join Mudge); Nixon 
Says He May Move to New York, L.A. TIMES, May 2, 1963, at 2 (discussing Nixon’s potential 
“business ventures” in New York). 
297 Nixon denied this motivation, however.  “As for using New York as a base for politics, or 
interjecting myself into local politics, you may quote me as saying emphatically it is not 
so . . . . I am not coming to New York for any political reason whatsoever.”  Nixon Says He 
May Move to New York, supra note 296, at 2. 
298 AITKEN, supra note 290, at 307. 
299 GARMENT, supra note 5, at 99–102. 
300 On Nixon’s law practice in New York, see AMBROSE, supra note 295, at 17 (detailing Nix-
on’s reasons for choosing to work at a private law firm in New York); GARMENT, supra 
note 5, at 59 (discussing Nixon’s use of the law firm as the base for his political activities); 
HOFFMAN, supra note 42, at 106 (discussing Nixon’s ability to harness the resources of the 
law firm for his political future). 
301 GARMENT, supra note 5, at 109. 
302 AMBROSE, supra note 295, at 24–25. 
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of the Republican hierarchy[,] and campaigning like a warrior in the 
cause of his party during the leanest of lean years.”303  Nixon “pre-
pared himself for his comeback with the discipline of a former heav-
yweight champion returning to the ring.”304 
Sometime in 1964, Garment hit upon the Hill case as a possible 
vehicle for Nixon’s rehabilitation.  Garment recalled the first time he 
mentioned the Hill case to Nixon.  It was after the trial had taken 
place and during the appellate process.  “Nixon listened carefully to 
my description of the case,” Garment recalled.305 
The magazine wasn’t out to injure the Hills, he remarked; it just didn’t 
give a good goddamn about them.  It was only interested in selling its 
goddamn magazine.  That’s what makes it so infuriating, he went on.  All 
that fancy First Amendment talk—just a lot of pious bullshit while they 
exploit the hell out of you.306 
Garment envisioned Nixon arguing the case before the Supreme 
Court.  While Garment would remain involved in Hill, doing much of 
the research and brief-writing, Nixon would serve as Hill’s public 
face.307  This could cast Nixon in a new light, as a principled champi-
on of constitutional values and a crusader for the besieged privacy 
rights of ordinary Americans, rather than the rejected politician and 
“sore loser.”308 
Nixon realized that there were advantages and drawbacks to be-
coming involved in Time, Inc. v. Hill.  The case would pit him against 
one of the most powerful publishing empires in the country, which 
could make it seem that he was still waging his war against the press.309  
Nixon also had a long rivalry with Earl Warren.  Warren became in-
furiated with Nixon during the 1952 Republican Convention, when 
Nixon promised to support Warren for President but instead sup-
ported Eisenhower—a contempt that was almost a “visceral repug-
nance,” according to Warren biographer Bernard Schwartz.310  On the 
other hand, Nixon was excited by the intellectual challenge of the ar-
gument and had personal sympathy for the Hills.  Eventually, Nixon 
took on the case, realizing the potentially significant consequences 
for the law and for his own future.311 
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VI.  TIME, INC. V. HILL 
In the fall of 1965, Time, Inc. filed an appeal with the U.S. Su-
preme Court.312  The constitutional question was 
[W]hether Sections 50 and 51 of the New York Civil Rights Law abridge 
the freedom of the press when they are construed to permit the award of 
damages for invasion of privacy by the publication of a review of a play 
that resembled a prior incident involving a private person, the review and 
accompanying photographs being inaccurate in some particulars.313 
Time, Inc.’s lawyers sought to parallel the case to Sullivan, in which a 
minor and careless error in a publication on an important public is-
sue resulted in a large and punitive judgment against a major pub-
lisher.314 
The question, then, is whether New York can properly impose . . . liability 
upon a publisher who connects without malice a non-public figure to a 
current news event in a report containing factual errors that could have 
been obviated by a more diligent investigation.  The recital of that ques-
tion suggests its inevitable answer under the First Amendment.  To re-
quire the press to be totally accurate at its peril is precisely the kind of 
‘self-censorship’ that was so roundly condemned in the Times opinion.315 
“Like the citizen-critic, who has a duty to judge his government, the 
fourth estate has a duty to report the news.  If that duty is encum-
bered by liabilities arising out of factual error or exaggeration, then it 
will not always be fully discharged, and the entire community suf-
fers.”316 
Just as Sullivan subjected libel law to the First Amendment’s pur-
view, the Court should constitutionalize the tort of privacy, Medina 
argued.  The “time ha[d] come for a decision making it clear that the 
First Amendment is present in what has traditionally been considered 
‘tort territory.’”317  “As in the Times case, the occasion for a confronta-
tion is at hand. . .”318  On December 6, 1965, in a decision reported 
 
312 Under the law at the time, Time, Inc. had a statutory right of appeal.  See 28 U.S.C. § 
1257. 
313 Jurisdictional Statement at 2–3, Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967). 
314 Id. at 8–9. 
315 Id. at 20 (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279 (1964)). 
316 Id. (internal citation omitted). 
317 Id. at 8 (quoting Marc A. Franklin, A Constitutional Problem in Privacy Protection:  Legal Inhi-
bitions on Reporting of Fact, 16 STAN. L. REV. 107, 139 (1963)).  “For nearly seventy-five years 
there has been some murky understanding that freedom of expression is involved in the 
law of privacy, and yet to this day that body of law has still to be ‘measured by standards 
that satisfy the First Amendment.’”  Jurisdictional Statement at 12, Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 
U.S. 374 (1967). 
318 Jurisdictional Statement at 9, Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967).  See also High Court 
Takes a Suit on Privacy, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 1965, at 35 (reporting on the Supreme Court’s 
decision to review the Hill case).  Justices Fortas, Warren, Stewart, and Clark voted not to 
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widely in the press, the Court announced that it would take the case 
to consider the “important constitutional questions of freedom of 
speech and press involved.”319 
A.  Arguments 
Against the backdrop of cultural concerns with privacy and free 
speech, and in the shadow of Sullivan and Griswold, the Hill case came 
to the Court freighted with a good deal of significance.  From the 
time Cravath filed the appeal there was public interest in the case, 
enhanced by the presence of Nixon.  The issues had personal mean-
ing to several of the Justices, who had strong positions on the issues 
of privacy, free expression, and press privilege.  The Justices were also 
aware of the case’s legal importance.  Hill raised doctrinal issues that 
were highly contested on the Court in 1965—the status of the consti-
tutional right to privacy, the absolutism-balancing debate, and possi-
ble extensions of New York Times v. Sullivan. 
Since Sullivan, the Court had been concerned with its implications 
and applications to different categories of plaintiffs and subject mat-
ter.  As the Times’ lawyer Herbert Wechsler had written presciently, 
“one could not fairly ask the Court . . . to foresee in one opinion all 
the problems that would evolve from this demarche in constitutional 
law.”320  It was unclear whether the privilege should extend beyond 
high-level public officials to lower-ranked officials, if it should apply 
to a broader class of “public figures,” and perhaps even to all dis-
course on “public affairs.”321  Sullivan had announced a broad com-
mitment to “the principle that debate on public issues should be un-
inhibited, robust, and wide-open.”322  The influential law professor 
Harry Kalven, Jr. suggested that such language implicitly invited the 
Court to extend the holding in a “dialectic progression from public 
 
hear the case—a significant lineup, given the eventual outcome of the case.  October 
Term 1966 History, William Brennan Papers, Library of Congress. 
319 Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 380 (1967). 
320 LEWIS, supra note 5, at 183. 
321 At the same time as the Hill case, the Court heard two cases involving the extension of the 
Sullivan principle in the libel context.  In Rosenblatt v. Baer, the Court defined public offi-
cials as those who have “substantial responsibility for or control over the conduct of gov-
ernmental affairs.”  383 U.S. 75, 85 (1966).  In 1967, the Court extended the Sullivan rule 
to “public figures” “involved in issues in which the public has a justified and important in-
terest.”  Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 134 (1967). 
322 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964). 
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official[s] to government policy to public policy to matters in the 
public domain.”323 
1.  Time, Inc. 
In this vein, Medina’s brief argued that the Sullivan reckless disre-
gard standard should apply to speech on “matters of public concern” 
regardless of whether it involved public officials, public figures, or 
private citizens like the Hills.  There should be “general constitution-
al protection [for] the press against damage awards” so long as the 
publication “makes some contribution to the dissemination of infor-
mation or ideas, that is, to what is most broadly conceived to be 
news.”324  In effect, he was asking the court to constitutionalize a ver-
sion of the newsworthiness privilege that had been recognized under 
the New York statute and as a matter of common law privacy doc-
trine.325 
Medina invoked a “two-level theory” of the First Amendment, a 
kind of “definitional balancing” that had been suggested by the Court 
in cases involving various kinds of objectionable speech; among 
them, Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire (1942) (involving fighting words); 
Beauharnais v. Illinois (1952) (group libel), and Roth v. United States 
(1957) (obscenity).326  These cases had implied that there were two 
categories of speech, protected speech that had “social value” and 
speech that was beneath First Amendment concerns.  Advertising, 
 
323 Kalven, Jr., supra note 229, at 221.  A number of legal scholars had urged the Court to 
make precisely this move.  See, e.g., William O. Bertelsman, Libel and Public Men, 52 A.B.A 
J. 657, 661 (1966) (attempting to resolve the tension between free speech and the right to 
a good name by proposing “the legitimate public interest test,” described as “the exist-
ence of a legitimate public interest in free discussion of the events from which the defa-
mation arises”); Willard H. Pedrick, Freedom of the Press and the Law of Libel:  The Modern Re-
vised Translation, 49 CORNELL L.Q. 581, 589 (1964) (predicting that the Supreme Court 
would expand the announced First Amendment privilege beyond criticism of “official 
conduct of public officials”); Donald R. Adair, Note, Free Speech and Defamation of Public 
Persons:  The Expanding Doctrine of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 52 CORNELL L. Q. 419, 
419 (1966) (noting that the doctrine that the Sullivan court had developed proved to be 
relevant not only in cases concerning public officials, but in those involving candidates 
running for officials and private citizens as well). 
324 Jurisdictional Statement at 14, Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967) (citations omitted). 
325 Id. at 10–11. 
326 Id. at 14–15; see Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957) (holding that obscenity is 
not afforded constitutional protection); Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 256–57 
(1952) (concluding that a statute making it a crime to distribute publications containing 
racist rhetoric did not violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments); Chaplinsky v. New 
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942) (asserting that “words which by their very utter-
ance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace” are not constitu-
tionally protected). 
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false words, incitements, and obscenity had been historically unpro-
tected.327  As the majority noted in Chaplinsky, “[t]here are certain 
well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention 
and punishment of which has never been thought to raise any consti-
tutional problem.   These include the lewd and obscene, the profane, 
the libelous, and the insulting or ‘fighting’ words . . . .”328 
Life’s article, describing a newsworthy matter of public concern, 
was protected speech, Medina argued.  “In the present case, appel-
lant reviewed a current newsworthy event which bore a substantial 
connection to a newsworthy event that had occurred some two and 
one-half years before.  Such a publication, without more, is entitled to 
constitutional protection.”329  “As opposed to the libel and obscenity 
cases, we are here dealing with an expression regarding public facts 
that has substantial ‘social value.’”330  Negligent errors in otherwise 
newsworthy material did not cast speech into unprotected territory, 
he asserted.  Medina asked the Court to prohibit liability under the 
New York statute for the publication of matters of public concern un-
less the plaintiff could demonstrate that the material was false and 
the error made with reckless disregard of the truth.331 
2.  Nixon 
To Nixon, there was no free speech issue in the case.332  Using the 
“two-level” theory, Nixon’s brief argued that false speech and adver-
tisements were outside the area of free speech, and so was the Life ar-
ticle.333  “What overriding interest does the Constitution have in pro-
tecting false words, prepared in a commercial setting, when they 
cause serious injury to private persons who have done everything in 
their power to avoid exploitation and publicity?”334  False and com-
 
327 See Emerson supra note 203, at 910, 937. 
328 Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572.  In Roth, Brennan had written that “[a]ll ideas having even the 
slightest redeeming social importance . . . have the full protection of the [First Amend-
ment’s] guaranties, unless excludable because they encroach upon the limited area of 
more important interests.”  Roth, 354 U.S. at 484.  Obscenity was outside this area.  Id. at 
484–85. 
329 Brief for the Appellant at 25, Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967). 
330 Id. at 39. 
331 Jurisdictional Statement at 23, Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967) (requesting that the 
Court announce a federal rule providing that as long as what is being published has “so-
cial value,” it would be afforded constitutional protection against criminal or tort liability 
for invasion of privacy). 
332 Motion to Dismiss at 13, Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967). 
333 Brief for the Appellant at 39–40, Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967). 
334 Brief for the Appellee at 37, Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967). 
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mercialized publications were not an “essential part of any exposition 
of ideas.”  “Our fundamental position is this:  It is simply inconceiva-
ble that the law is powerless to protect an individual from harmful 
exploitation through deliberate lying.”335 
Sullivan had no relevance to Hill, he assured the Court.  As Gar-
ment had observed in a memo to Nixon, “Cravath is making a 
strained effort to fit this into the facts of New York Times.”  “The ob-
vious distinction between New York Times and this case is that the 
former involved statements concerning a public official.”336  Part of 
Sullivan’s rationale had been that officials “waived” their reputational 
rights when they entered the political arena.337  Public officials could 
also defend themselves without the aid of the law; their visibility and 
status gave them a platform from which to rebut injurious state-
ments.338  The Hills had no such means of self-defense.  “1. Public 
man has some power to rectify the wrong sans legal remedy.  2. Pri-
vate man is helpless,” Nixon jotted in a note to himself.339 
Garment was confident that the Court would reject Medina’s ef-
forts to extend Sullivan.  “If the Court accepts Cravath’s argument 
and equates the Life article with the New York Times advertisement it 
will have made an enormous extension in New York Times doctrine,” 
Garment wrote to Nixon.340  Even if Sullivan were to apply, the Hills’ 
lawyers argued to the Court, the actual malice standard had been sat-
isfied.  Life’s editors had been shown at trial to have been “indifferent 
to [] the falsity of the connection” between the Hills and the Desperate 
Hours.341  Reckless disregard of the truth was “implicit” in a finding of 
intentional falsification.342 
While Medina tried to align Hill with Sullivan, Nixon cast Hill in 
the image of Griswold.  Time, Inc. v. Hill, like Griswold, was a case about 
the disappearance of privacy in America and much-needed legal pro-
tections for the “right to be let alone.”343  Drawing on academic and 
 
335 Memorandum, undated, Wilderness Years Collection, Series VI, Legal Papers, Time, Inc. 
v. Hill (on file with the Nixon Presidential Library). 
336 Memorandum from Garment to Nixon, Wilderness Years Collection, Series VI, Legal Pa-
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theoretical works on privacy, as well as contemporary, popular writ-
ings such as the bestselling book The Naked Society, the Nixon brief was 
an emotional paean to the importance of privacy to individual auton-
omy, dignity, and selfhood.  “The right to privacy is fundamental to 
our constitutional system.  Like the freedom to speak and write and 
print, it is vital to the growth of the individual and the enrichment of 
society.”344  “Whether a particular privacy has specific protection, as in 
the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, or has other more general protec-
tion under the Constitution, [as in Griswold v. Connecticut], it derives 
meaning from the unifying concept of ‘the essential dignity and 
worth of every human being—a concept at the root of any decent sys-
tem of ordered liberty.’”345  “The law of privacy affirms a conviction 
that, even in a society increasingly characterized by powerful and im-
personal organizations of government and commerce, the personality 
of the individual is worth protecting.”346 
Extending Griswold, Nixon asserted that the right to privacy not 
only shielded people from intrusions by the state, but also from pri-
vate actors like the press.  “The Constitution, by definition and impli-
cation, recognizes protected privacies and secures them from gov-
ernmental intrusions.  No less central to our constitutional plan is the 
power and responsibility of the individual states to protect their citi-
zens from unreasonable intrusions and injury at the hands of indi-
viduals.”347  Nixon argued that Griswold had implicitly raised the tort 
right to privacy to constitutional stature.  Griswold was “valid prece-
dent for [Hill] because it recognizes that the Bill of Rights protects 
the privacy of an individual.”348 
B.  Yellow Notepads 
In the weeks before the oral argument in April 1966, Nixon pre-
pared obsessively for his performance.  Associates at the firm pre-
pared memo upon memo for Nixon to digest and lists of reading on 
privacy and free speech, including writings by Meiklejohn and other 
legal scholars, published talks by Justice Brennan on the First 
Amendment, popular literature on privacy, and dozens of privacy 
cases under the New York statute.  He memorized the trial record, 
relevant precedents, and dozens of law review articles.  As the oral ar-
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gument neared, he set up “skull sessions,” question and answer ses-
sions with his colleagues simulating court argument.349  As Nixon re-
called, “I locked myself up in my office for two weeks.  No phone 
calls.  No interruptions.  It [took] a tremendous amount of concen-
tration.”350  Nixon was driven to give the best possible performance in 
his return to the public stage; whether or not he admitted it, he was 
also enacting his vendetta against the press. 
Throughout his career Nixon was notorious for his scribbling on 
long, lined yellow legal notepads.  Nixon’s “closest friend was the al-
ways available, always compliant, always silent yellow pad,” Garment 
recalled.  “It . . . served as a kind of door through which he could 
walk and shut out the world.  When Nixon took out his yellow pad 
and unscrewed his pen, you knew it was time to move on.”351  Nixon’s 
presidential archives contain literally hundreds of yellow pages with 
his notes on the Hill case, in his scrawling, cramped hand.  As he 
wrote on March 14, 1966, commenting on Cravath’s “weak points”:  
“1) They equate Hills with public figures!  2) Attempt to extend Sulli-
van—no reasoning.  3) fiction by definition is deliberate untruth.”352  
He developed an arsenal of provocative attacks on Life that he 
planned to deliver at oral argument.  “I like my magazine newsy, ex-
citing, and stimulating, but not at the cost of invading privacy of a just 
ordinary middle class family by using their name in a fictional setting 
for commercial gain.”353  “With Hills they threw caution to the winds 
to get maximum impact for benefit of magazine and collateral 
event—the show.”354  He described Life’s technique of fabricating 
news as “hoaxing.”355  “Such hoaxing neither educates nor informs, 
and therefore does not present a First Amendment problem,” he 
wrote.356 
Memos circulated in the office before the oral argument scruti-
nized the Justices’ personalities and predicted their votes.357  Chief 
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Justice Warren, a former two-term governor of California, was not an 
intellectual, but he was a skilled politician whose talent was his ability 
to create harmony within small groups.  His jurisprudence, emphasiz-
ing individual rights and liberties, was practical and human-driven; 
Warren tended to place personal sympathies and equitable consider-
ations over legal formalities.358 
In his eighties, Hugo Black was, according to one Court historian, 
“on the downslide,” becoming increasingly acerbic and more tena-
ciously committed to his unique jurisprudence.359  William Douglas, 
who constituted the liberal wing of the Court with Warren and Bren-
nan, had always been iconoclastic and eccentric; Douglas perceived 
himself as a rebel and a loner and derived great satisfaction from 
writing provocative solo dissents.360  More than any other member of 
the Court, Douglas was a results-oriented justice who seemed to care 
little about formal doctrine and explaining the reasoning for his posi-
tions.361 
The conservative John Marshall Harlan remained committed to 
his position of legislative deference and a “jurisprudence that could 
explain only incremental change.”362  Harlan was often joined ideo-
logically with Tom Clark, a former attorney general who had been 
appointed by President Truman.  Byron White and Potter Stewart 
were moderates, known for their practical, nondoctrinal approach-
es.363  White and Stewart were also swing votes who made unpredicta-
ble alliances.364  Abe Fortas, former high-profile Washington attorney, 
lawyer for Lyndon Johnson, and counsel for the defendant in Gideon 
v. Wainwright, had been appointed to the Court in 1965 to replace Ar-
thur Goldberg.365  Fortas, who joined the liberal wing, established 
himself as a judicial pragmatist; even more than Douglas, Fortas “had 
 
THE WARREN COURT:  A RETROSPECTIVE (1996); MARK TUSHNET, THE WARREN COURT IN 
HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL PERSPECTIVE (1993). 
358 LUCAS A. POWE, THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS 303 (2009).  On Warren, 
see generally JIM NEWTON, JUSTICE FOR ALL:  EARL WARREN AND THE NATION HE MADE 
(2006); ED CRAY, CHIEF JUSTICE:  A BIOGRAPHY OF EARL WARREN (1997); G. EDWARD 
WHITE, EARL WARREN: A PUBLIC LIFE (1982). 
359 POWE JR., supra note 230, at 303.  On Black, see generally HOWARD BALL, HUGO L. BLACK: 
COLD STEEL WARRIOR (1996); ROGER K. NEWMAN, HUGO BLACK, A BIOGRAPHY (1994); 
TINSLEY E. YARBROUGH, MR. JUSTICE BLACK AND HIS CRITICS (1988). 
360 On Douglas, see generally BRUCE ALLEN MURPHY, WILD BILL:  THE LEGEND AND LIFE OF 
WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS (2003); WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS, THE COURT YEARS (1980). 
361 HALL & UROFSKY, supra note 122, at 141. 
362 POWE JR., supra note 2300, at 304. 
363 LEVINE & WERMIEL, supra note 5, at 10–11. 
364 Id. at 10. 
365 LAURA KALMAN, ABE FORTAS:  A BIOGRAPHY 244–45 (1990). 
Dec. 2015] WHEN PRIVACY ALMOST WON 559 
 
contempt for the explanatory process . . . . [O]nce he knew his de-
sired outcome, he couldn’t care less how he got there,” writes histori-
an Lucas Powe.366 
A memo predicted that Warren would support the Hills’ position.  
“Warren has taken a strong position in defense of the rights of an in-
dividual criminal accused or arrestee who is often helpless to defend 
himself against the collective power of society; in Hill he may 
be . . . predisposed to protect an individual injured by a more power-
ful social force.”367  Black and Douglas would obviously go for Time, 
Inc.  Harlan, Clark, White, and Stewart were wild cards.  Harlan gen-
erally sided with the instrumentalities of government, but Harlan and 
Stewart had voted against the majority’s recent decision in Ginzberg v. 
U.S. to convict the publisher of an obscene magazine, suggesting they 
might side with the press.368  However, Stewart had also voiced con-
cerns about extending Sullivan to plaintiffs who were not public offi-
cials.369 
Brennan “has recently emerged as the most important First 
Amendment spokesman on the Court,” the memo observed.370  The 
brief was “addressed to Brennan more than any other member of the 
Court.”371  Fortas was perhaps “the least predictable justice on First 
Amendment questions.”372  Fortas was part of the liberal bloc, but he 
had also decided against civil liberties, voting with the majority in 
Ginzberg.373  The memo concluded:  “Fortas’ work in Gideon, however, 
may predispose him, like Warren, to give greater weight than Bren-
nan” to the interests of sympathetic figures like the Hills.374 
C.  April 27, 1966 
On April 27, 1966, Nixon and Medina arrived at the Court for oral 
argument.  The tension in the courtroom, packed with press corre-
spondents, was palpable.  “Staring up at his old rival [Warren], re-
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flecting on the indignities each had served on the other over the 
years, Nixon had to blanch at how thoroughly Warren once again 
controlled his destiny,” writes a Warren biographer.375  But Nixon 
came to Washington on a high tide of confidence, fueled by the good 
wishes of many supporters, including James Hill, who sent Nixon a 
handwritten note a week before the argument. 
Dear Dick, Just wanted you to know that we are glad you are with us in 
the final round of our fight.  If we don’t lick them next week in Washing-
ton I’ll be glad to barnstorm the country with you to see if public opinion 
can’t do what proper legal channels should have taken care of years ago.  
Am sure this won’t be necessary.  Will be in Washington next week push-
ing with you.”376 
Medina spoke first.377  He reiterated that Life’s falsity was inci-
dental and negligent; the “difference between saying strikingly similar 
and inspired [or] reenacted is so small that we shouldn’t be charged 
$30,000 for it and we shouldn’t be worrying about it.”378  He pressed 
on the application of Sullivan, asserting that the jury instruction was 
constitutionally flawed because it did not require the Hills to prove 
that the falsity of Life’s statement had been made with reckless disre-
gard of the truth.379 
Medina also raised concerns with a concurring opinion in the 
state appeals court’s decision.  Judge Benjamin Rabin of the Appel-
late Division had suggested that a newsworthy article, if presented 
solely for the purpose of “increasing circulation,” could be subject to 
liability under the New York statute as a “trade” or “commercial” pub-
lication.380  Under this reading, a newspaper could be liable for pub-
lishing material in order to attract readers; if this were true, the stat-
ute was not only absurd but unconstitutional.381  Medina’s 
introduction of the “Rabin dictum” into the dialogue added a new 
twist to the case, and as it turned out, shifted its course. 
Nixon insisted that the Life publication was intentionally falsified 
and that there was no constitutional rationale for protecting it.  Re-
gardless of whether the jury had been explicitly instructed on it, he 
argued, Life’s reckless disregard of the truth was made manifest at tri-
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al.382  Nixon challenged Medina’s reading of the New York statute, ar-
guing that only false and fictionalized works were actionable under 
New York law—true, newsworthy material had never been penal-
ized—and that Rabin’s statement, a throwaway line in a concurrence, 
was nonbinding as law.383 
“Dressed somberly in a black suit and starched collar”384 and “ap-
pearing as comfortable in his role as a lawyer as he did in politics,”385 
according to the press, Nixon delivered an argument that was skilled 
and workmanlike.  New York Times journalist Fred Graham, who was 
there that day, recalled that Nixon’s argument was devoid of the “self-
important posturing” that was so often present when other political 
figures argued before the Court.386  “Nixon . . . was at times candid to 
a fault,” Graham noted.  Worried that he might play into the cun-
ning, “Tricky Dick” image of his political days, Nixon responded to 
the Justices’ questioning with a candor that “at times seemed to con-
cede more than necessary.”387  Nixon’s argument was filled with dra-
matic lines he had written out carefully on his yellow pads and com-
mitted to memory.  Life was “completely unconcerned about the 
Hills, knew nothing about them, and made no effort to find out what 
actually had happened during the incident,” he told the Court.”  
They were using these people as props . . . for the purpose of making 
the article more readable and for selling more magazines.”388  “Life 
lied and it knew it lied” was a favorite phrase.389  He reminded the 
Court of the importance of the case:  privacy was “an area of the law 
which deserves a paramount measure of protection because . . . it’s an 
area where you have the fundamental problem that confronts all 
Americans today . . . how does an individual remain an individual in 
our mass communication society?”390 
Warren voiced hostility towards the press and Medina but gave no 
hint of his enmity towards Nixon.391  Fortas at times pressed hard, 
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playing devil’s advocate, but was generally supportive of Nixon’s posi-
tion.392  Both Fortas and Warren were clearly thinking about privacy 
more broadly than the narrow terms of the New York statute.  Did the 
press have a right to record a married couple in their bedroom and 
broadcast the recording if it was newsworthy?  Could the press dredge 
up long-hidden facts about a person and publish them if they there 
was public interest in them? 
Black was outspokenly against Nixon.  Why wouldn’t the New York 
statute potentially cover “every news item . . . or every editorial”? he 
asked.  “Doesn’t any publication made about a human being affect 
his privacy?”393  The statements by Warren and Fortas were surprising 
to Nixon, given how much both men opposed Nixon’s politics. Nixon 
later commented that because Warren and Fortas had both been in 
the public eye before coming to the Court, they “knew firsthand how 
fierce and lacerating the press could be when it fastened on a tar-
get.”394  At a Court luncheon shortly after the argument, the Justices 
expressed surprise that Nixon had done so well.395  Fortas believed 
that Nixon had made one of the best arguments that he had heard 
on the Court and that Nixon could develop into one of the “great ad-
vocates of our times.”396 
The next morning Garment found on his desk a five page, single- 
spaced memorandum addressed to him from Nixon.  Upon arriving 
at his Fifth Avenue apartment after the oral argument, Nixon had 
dictated a tape of commentary, transcribed by Nixon’s secretary.  
“Now that the case is over, here are some of the points I believe de-
served more emphasis in the oral argument,” read the memo.”  I only 
wish there were some way we could ethically transmit some of these 
thoughts to the clerks who will be helping the justices write their 
briefs!”397 
Exhibiting a trademark, self-deprecating streak, Nixon criticized 
his performance. He believed that he should have stressed the brutal-
ity and “ugly incidents” in the Desperate Hours, which would have 
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brought home the seriousness of the offense to the Hills.398  Nixon al-
so acknowledged the weakness of his privacy argument.  He admitted 
that Griswold was not really on point, since the state was not infringing 
on the Hills’ privacy; “here the question is not the power of the state 
to infringe on a right but the power of the state to recognize and im-
plement a right.”399  He thought it might have been wise to ‘down-
grade’ the Hills’ right to privacy from a freestanding constitutional 
right to “one of those areas where the state had the power under the 
Ninth and Tenth Amendments to give redress to private citizens 
where they are injured by other private citizens.”400  This would offer 
privacy greater protection than leaving it to rest on the shaky founda-
tions of Griswold.401 
A good portion of the memo is devoted to his concerns about 
media publicity. Nixon claimed that “there were no columnists or na-
tionally known reporters present” at the oral argument, although it 
did in fact receive quite a bit of press coverage.  The press comments 
on Nixon’s performance were overwhelmingly positive; the Washing-
ton Post’s Supreme Court reporter described Nixon’s performance as 
“one of the better oral arguments of the year.”402  But there wasn’t as 
much publicity as Nixon wanted, and he wondered whether the poor 
coverage was an indication of an attempted “blackout” by the “press 
establishment.”  Oddly, he feared that Time, Inc. had talked to the 
New York Times, the top officials of the Associated Press, and “even the 
Newsweek crowd” and “warned them of the consequences of giving any 
significant publicity to our presentation.”  He admitted that the lack 
of publicity had no effect on whether they won the case, or whether 
the law firm won more clients, but it did have an effect on his politi-
cal plans—as he put it, “in terms of other considerations which are 
broader than our purely ‘commercial’ interests.”403 
He thanked Garment for letting him argue Time, Inc. v. Hill.  
“Your stepping aside when you yourself could have handled the mat-
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ter in brilliant fashion demonstrated a selflessness which is very rare 
in our firm or any other firm for that matter,” he wrote.  “I only hope 
that you will get some much deserved ‘dividends’ in the future!”404  
After he was elected President, Nixon appointed Garment to the 
White House staff as a special consultant to the President.405 
VII.  DECISIONS 
Two days after the oral argument the Court met in its private con-
ference, the session where the Justices discussed the cases heard that 
week and voted on the outcome.  The conference is secret, and the 
record of the meeting in Time, Inc. v. Hill comes from a handwritten 
memo by William Douglas, held in his personal papers.406  The lines 
of fracture in the Hill case were clear going into the conference.  The 
primary disputes revolved around First Amendment absolutism and 
balancing, the extension of Sullivan, and the reach and scope of Gris-
wold’s right to privacy. 
A.  The First Conference 
Chief Justice Warren, speaking first, voted to affirm the New York 
Court of Appeals.  The Life article was not “news,” he said. “It is a fic-
tionalization of an incident that was false in a material respect and 
can constitutionally be actionable.”407  Warren had long been con-
cerned with the excesses of the press, and the Hill case offered him a 
venue to express his grievances with the media.408 
Justices Clark, Fortas, Stewart, and Harlan agreed with Warren.409  
In a position he would later come to regret, Brennan also joined the 
majority, convinced that Sullivan was not relevant to Hill.  “Times 
could be distinguished on a multifactor approach,” Brennan wrote in 
a handwritten memo.410  The Hill case involved a “1) non-
governmental . . . issue; 2) not a daily reporting—no need for haste; 
3) Hill did not thrust himself into [publicity][;] 4). . .[Life] had 
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available sources . . . [and] had sources to check.”411  Black, not sur-
prisingly, voted to reverse, claiming that a newspaper “can use fiction 
under the First Amendment.”  Douglas and White also voted to re-
verse.412  The unanimity that had surrounded the Sullivan decision 
was unraveling in the face of the very different facts of the Hill case.413 
Warren assigned the opinion to Fortas, who proceeded to issue a 
scathing invective against Time, Inc.  Fortas, who had essentially 
adopted Nixon’s argument, circulated an initial—and as it turned 
out, ill-fated—version of his majority opinion on June 8, 1966.414  
“The facts of this case are unavoidably distressing,” he began. 
Needless, heedless, wanton and deliberate injury of the sort inflicted by 
Life’s picture story is not an essential instrument of responsible journal-
ism. Magazine writers and editors are not by reason of their high office 
relieved of the common obligation to avoid deliberately inflicting wanton 
and unnecessary injury.  The prerogatives of the press . . . do not pre-
clude reasonable care and avoidance of casual infliction of injury to oth-
ers totally unexplainable by any purpose or circumstance related to its 
function of reporting or discussing the news or publishing matters of in-
terest to its readers.  They do not confer a license for pointless assault.  
The injury to the Hill family illustrates the consequences of recklessness 
and irresponsibility in the use of mass media.415 
Fortas conceded that important free speech issues were at stake. 
“This Nation is prepared to pay a heavy price for the immunity of the 
press in terms of national discomfort and danger in the tolerance of a 
measure of individual assault.”  But  
freedom of the press does not require that the state withhold its aid from 
persons threatened with misappropriation of their identity for purposes 
which have no relation to public information and which are nothing 
more than the knowingly false attribution of events to a named person 
for the purpose of accentuating the dramatic or entertainment value of a 
publication.416 
Like Nixon’s, Fortas’s view of the case was structured around Gris-
wold. Fortas described Griswold and the constitutional right to privacy 
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in more sweeping terms than anyone on the Court had ever done.417  
Citing Griswold, as well as several other rulings on Fourth, Fifth, and 
First Amendment privacy, he wrote, 
There is . . . no doubt that a fundamental right of privacy exists, and that 
it is of constitutional stature.  It is not just the right to a remedy against 
false accusation . . . it is not only the right to be secure in one’s person, 
house, papers, and effects . . . it is more than the specific right to be se-
cure against the Peeping Tom or the intrusion of electronic espionage 
devices and wire-tapping.  All of these are aspects of the right to privacy, 
but privacy reaches beyond any of its specifics.  It is, simply stated, the 
right to be let alone; to live one’s life as one chooses, free from assault, 
intrusion, or invasion except as they can be justified by the clear needs of 
community living under a government of law.418 
Fortas accepted Nixon’s framing of privacy as an expansive right 
against invasions by both private and state actors.  If “privacy is a basic 
right,” whether one considers it derived from the First, Fourth, Fifth, 
or Ninth Amendments, or otherwise, “it follow[s] that the States may, 
by appropriate legislation and within proper bounds, enact laws to 
vindicate that right.”419  The Fortas position would have extended the 
constitutional protections for privacy not only to victims of false pub-
licity like the Hills, but to people cruelly thrust before the public gaze 
in truthful publications, overriding the state law newsworthiness privi-
lege in some contexts.  Had the Fortas opinion come down as law, the 
right to privacy against the press, on par with Fourth Amendment 
privacies, would have been strengthened enormously.  That did not 
come to pass. 
Fortas agreed with Nixon that Sullivan was irrelevant to the case. 
The Life article “was not a retelling of a newsworthy incident or an 
event relating to a public figure.”420  “The deliberate, callous invasion 
of the Hills’ right to be le[f]t alone—this appropriation of a family’s 
right not to be molested or to have its name exploited and its quiet 
existence invaded—cannot be defended on the ground that it is with-
in the purview of a constitutional guarantee designed to protect the 
free exchange of ideas and opinions,” he wrote.421  “Many . . . difficult 
problems may arise under the right-to-privacy statute, but we con-
clude that the present case, on its facts and on the New York law as 
 
417 See LAURA KALMAN, supra note 365, at 264–65 (“While Griswold had suggested that a right 
to privacy existed in limited circumstances, Fortas now described its existence in broader 
terms than any member of the Court had ever used.”). 
418 SCHWARTZ, SUPER CHIEF, supra note 5, at 243. 
419 KALMAN, supra note 365, at 265. 
420 Fortas draft opinion, Time, Inc. v. Hill, June 8, 1966, Box 545, Earl Warren Papers, Li-
brary of Congress. 
421 Id. 
Dec. 2015] WHEN PRIVACY ALMOST WON 567 
 
construed by the courts of that state, does not permit the appellant to 
claim immunity from liability because of the First Amendment.”422 
Like Nixon, Fortas hated the press.  According to his biographer 
Laura Kalman, Fortas “loathed and feared the press,” due to his own 
unpleasant encounters with it, as well as those of his friend and bene-
factor, President Lyndon Johnson, who had appointed him to the 
bench.423  During his time in private practice, in the McCarthy years, 
Fortas had represented many clients whose names were smeared in 
the press.  By 1966, Fortas was actively seeking to narrow the scope of 
press freedom as set out in Sullivan.  According to Kalman, Fortas 
“could not understand the insistence of justices Douglas and Black 
upon . . . First Amendment rights.  Indeed, he regarded their protec-
tion of the media with the same bemusement with which another in-
dividual would have contemplated a defender of the rattlesnake’s 
right to strike.”424 
The strongly worded Fortas opinion led to immediate reactions. 
Although Brennan joined the opinion, his penciled notes on his copy 
of the opinion make clear he thought Fortas had gone too far. He 
was unhappy with Fortas’s use of the word “titillate” to describe Life’s 
motivation for the article and thought Fortas might have been “dis-
torting the record” in his account of the facts.425 According to a 1966 
term history written by Brennan’s clerks, Brennan felt that the Fortas 
opinion was “replete with invective for the press,” and Brennan, who 
had championed the press in Sullivan, was offended. Fortas’s opin-
ion, his clerks wrote with alarm, “never once mentioned a First 
Amendment standard.”426 
Douglas issued a smug dissent. He agreed with Medina’s newswor-
thiness theory and asserted that “state action abridges freedom of the 
press . . . where the discussion concerns matters in the public do-
main.”427 Referencing Griswold, Douglas wrote that “it would be one 
thing if the press were battering down barricades to the sanctuary of 
our home,” but here there was no invasion of privacy.428 “[A] private 
person is catapulted into the news by events over which he had no 
control. He and his activities are then in the public domain as fully as 
 
422 Id. 
423 See KALMAN, supra note 365, at 262. 
424 Id. 
425 See Notes on Fortas draft opinion in Box I: 141, William J. Brennan Papers, Library of 
Congress. 
426 October Term 1966 History, William Brennan Papers, Library of Congress. 
427 Douglas Draft Dissent, June 9, 1966, Box 545, Earl Warren Papers, Library of Congress. 
428 Id. 
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the matters at issue in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.”429  Black agreed 
with Douglas but not his reference to the hated Griswold opinion: “I 
would like to agree with you but do not want to suggest an association 
such as you do with Griswold . . . I hope you can take it out,” he wrote 
to Douglas.  Douglas agreed, and Black joined the dissent.430 
White’s dissent focused on the Rabin dictum; he was concerned 
with the possibility that truthful, “commercialized” material could be 
actionable under the New York law.  He was also disturbed by the 
strict liability aspect of the statute.  “Given these characteristics, the 
New York privacy law cannot be squared with the First Amendment,” 
he wrote.431  In response to White, Fortas circulated a draft with ex-
tensive revisions.432  The Rabin concurrence was “not a correct state-
ment of New York law,” he argued, and the jury’s finding of inten-
tional falsification adequately demonstrated recklessness.433 
Meanwhile, Black seethed over the Fortas opinion.  He claimed 
that it was “the worst First Amendment opinion he had seen in a doz-
en years” and scribbled critiques on his copy of the opinion.  In his 
handwritten notes, Black accused Fortas of having enacted a “court 
vendetta against Time,” and claimed that the majority read into the 
record “every possible inference adverse to what the press has done.”  
The Fortas opinion was “grossly exaggerated” to make Time, Inc. 
look like an “ogre” and a tyrant.  Louis Brandeis, the architect of the 
tort right to privacy, “never ever intimated much less asserted that he 
was elevating a right to privacy to a constitutional plane on a level 
with the First Amendment.”  To give judges the “power to change the 
Constitution” as Fortas was doing was the hallmark of a “totalitarian 
regime.”434 
According to Fortas biographer Bruce Murphy, Black welcomed 
the bitter and sweeping Fortas opinion.  Black harbored personal an-
imosity towards Fortas, and the Hill draft “presented an opportunity 
to cut Fortas down to size.”435  Black planned to write a magnificent 
dissent, a treatise on First Amendment absolutism, but he needed 
 
429 Id. 
430 Black to Douglas, June 9, 1966, Box 1387, William O. Douglas Papers, Library of Con-
gress. 
431 White Draft Dissent, Box 545, Earl Warren Papers, Library of Congress. 
432 Note, Abe Fortas, June 14, 1966, Box 1387, William O. Douglas Papers, Library of Con-
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opinion.  I very much regret burdening all of you with this drastically revised opinion.”). 
433 Fortas draft opinion, June 14, 1966, Box 545, Earl Warren Papers, Library of Congress. 
434 Fortas draft opinion, June 14, 1966, Box 296, Hugo Black Papers, Library of Congress. 
435 MURPHY, supra note 366, at 231.  See also GARMENT, supra note 5, at 93. 
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more time for his project.  He thought that it would take him all 
summer to write his dissent, which would be the “greatest dissent of 
his life.”436  Black took advantage of Fortas’s extensive revisions of the 
draft, and he wrote a note to Fortas in which he insisted that because 
of the alterations he needed extra time to write his response.  The 
term was about to end; Black proposed that the case be held over to 
the following term so that he could properly address his concerns 
with the opinion.437 
Black’s entreaty, together with White’s doubts about the statute, 
persuaded Fortas to agree to have the case held over to the next term 
and reargued.  On June 16, 1966, Fortas issued an order requesting 
that Medina and Nixon return to the Court in the fall to address four 
questions: 
1) Is the truthful presentation of a newsworthy item ever actionable un-
der New York’s statute as construed or on its face?; 2) Should the per 
curiam opinion of the New York Court of Appeals be read as adopting 
the (Rabin concurrence)?; 3) Does the concept of fictionalization re-
quire reckless disregard of truth or falsity as a condition of liability?; 4) 
What are the First Amendment ramifications of the respective answers to 
the above questions.438 
Nixon, Garment, and the Mudge lawyers geared up for another 
round of questioning. Nixon interrupted his cross-country campaign-
ing for Republican candidates in the 1966 midterm elections and de-
voted three weeks to focusing on the arguments.439 
B.  The Black Memorandum 
Over the summer of 1966, Justice Black continued to fret over the 
Hill case.  He remained troubled by the strident and accusatory For-
tas opinion and the majority’s efforts to constrain constitutionally 
protected speech through its “weighing and balancing” approach, in 
which it weighed the worth of Time, Inc.’s speech against the value of 
the Hills’ privacy.  He began to write a dissent that he planned to cir-
culate to the Court right before the reargument.  Throughout the 
summer months he worked diligently on this effort, often staying up 
until the wee hours of the morning.  Black’s wife was both impressed 
 
436 Id. at 94. 
437 Id. at 106 (noting Black’s concerns and desire to postpone a decision on the case); 
MURPHY, supra note 360, at 231. 
438 Memorandum, Abe Fortas, June 16, 1966, Box 545, Earl Warren Papers, Library of Con-
gress. 
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and concerned by his devotion to the case.  As she wrote in her diary 
on August 12, 1966: 
Hugo has been working until around 1:30 every night.  He is working on 
this case he is so interested in.  It’s one that Abe Fortas got out about a 
week before the Court adjourned.  Hugo told them he was going to write 
a dissent this summer, so they agreed to get it reargued this fall.440 
An early draft from August 1966 reveals the tone of his writing; Black 
lamented the “exercise of this newly proclaimed power of judges to 
curb the American press” and condemned the majority’s “gross, fla-
grant refusal to give Time, Inc. the benefit of the First Amend-
ment.”441 
It was not only that Black was upset with Fortas’s seeming disre-
gard for the First Amendment and his expansive and textually un-
grounded interpretation of constitutional privacy.  Black disliked For-
tas personally.442  Fortas seemed to be reviving the ad hoc balancing 
that had been the hallmark of Felix Frankfurter, who had for many 
years been Black’s main enemy on the Court.443  Black believed that 
Fortas was using judicial power in “all the wrong directions” and was a 
purely “results-oriented” justice who had no regard for the Constitu-
tion.  Fortas was a “wheeler dealer . . . totally unprincipled and intel-
lectually dishonest,” Black claimed.444 
Fortas had come on strong in his first two years on the Court, with 
a “know-it-all attitude,” and Black felt threatened by this. Black saw 
Fortas as a “pretender to the throne of leadership.”445  All of the Jus-
tices were openly disturbed by Fortas’s ongoing connections to 
Lyndon Johnson, including offering advice to the President about Vi-
etnam, domestic unrest, and other issues.446  Shortly after Fortas 
joined the Court in 1965, Black began to attack him on several occa-
sions, including outbursts towards him in Court sessions.447 
The day before the reargument, on October 17, 1966, Black circu-
lated his masterpiece.  Supreme Court historian Bernard Schwartz 
characterized it as “more scathing in its condemnation of the weigh-
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358, at 475. 
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ing process than anything else ever published by Justice Black.”448  “By 
legal legerdemain,” the majority had transmuted “the First Amend-
ment’s promise of unequivocal press freedom . . . into a debased al-
loy,” Black wrote.   
The weighing process makes it infinitely easier for judges to exercise 
their newly proclaimed power to curb the press.  For under its aegis 
judges are no longer to be limited to their constitutional power to make 
binding interpretations of the Constitution.  That power . . . has become 
too prosaic and unexciting.  So the judiciary now confers upon the judi-
ciary the more ‘elastic’ and exciting power to decide, under its value-
weighing process, just how much freedom the courts will permit the press 
to have.449 
“Weighing and balancing” was bad enough, but it was even worse 
when the value that was being weighed against the First Amendment 
was the amorphous, fictive “right to privacy.”  Black thought it “fan-
tastic for judges to attempt to create . . . a general, all-embracing con-
stitutional provision guaranteeing a general right to privacy.”  He 
mocked Fortas’s tribute to privacy:  “Neither the ‘right to be let 
alone’ nor the ‘right to privacy,’ while appealing phrases, were en-
shrined in our Constitution, as was the right to free speech, press, 
and religion.”  “If the judges have . . . by their own fiat today created a 
right of privacy equal to or superior to the right of a free press that 
the Constitution created, then tomorrow and the next day and the 
next the judges can create more rights that balance away other cher-
ished Bill of Rights freedoms.”450 
Black attacked Fortas’s “graphic and biting” characterizations of 
Time, Inc.  Many of the “sharp criticisms and invectives” against 
Time, Inc. were “completely unsupported by the record,” he asserted.  
The majority opinion represented the “greatest threat” to freedom of 
speech and press he had seen in his time on the Court.  “One does 
not have to be a prophet, I think, to foresee that judgments like the 
one in this case can frighten and punish the press so much that pub-
lishers will cease trying to report news in a lively and readable fash-
ion,” Black concluded.451  Shortly afterwards, Fortas went to Black’s 
home, hurt and angered by what Black had written.  According to 
Elizabeth Black, the two men talked it out and “Abe left feeling 
OK.”452 
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C.  Reargument 
When Nixon and Medina appeared before the Court on October 
18, 1966, they were unaware of these bitter exchanges. Nixon was, in 
Garment’s opinion, even better and more relaxed than he had been 
in the first argument.453  The opposition to him, led by Black, White, 
and Brennan, was much fiercer, however.  Garment and Nixon 
sensed that the Court’s take had changed since the first argument—
”and from our point of view . . . for the worse.”454  The reporter for 
the Washington Post noted that “while Nixon took a tougher line, Me-
dina seemed to score more points with key Justices over involved 
questions of New York’s invasion of privacy law.”455 
White and Brennan expressed doubts as to the statute’s constitu-
tionality.  Over the summer, Brennan’s unease with the Fortas posi-
tion had grown into full-blown skepticism.  By this time, Brennan was 
receptive to Medina’s invitation to strike down the statute.  The Rabin 
dictum, suggesting that newsworthy material could be penalized if 
published for profit, “bothered him more than anything else in this 
case,” he said.456  Black asked Medina whether he thought the Sullivan 
standard was “written for that case alone” or “should it fit all cases 
under the First Amendment.”  “I think it should fit all cases under the 
First Amendment and specifically the nondefamatory language we 
have used about a public fact,” Medina replied.  “Nondefamatory 
language of public facts deserves the same protection as certainly 
as . . . defamatory language about public officials if you are going to 
have free public discussion.”457 
Nixon pointed out that the Hills were not public figures, and that 
if the Court applied Sullivan, private figures would receive less protec-
tion for their privacy than for their reputations.  Under the Court’s 
libel doctrine at the time, the reckless disregard standard applied on-
ly to statements on public officials; the Court left intact the common 
law, strict liability rule for “private libels.”  Medina’s proposal would 
create a discrepancy between libel and privacy law.  Nixon challenged 
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the Justices to explain why the interest in privacy was worth less than 
the interest in reputation.   
Two days after the reargument, in the Court’s second conference 
on the case, the votes had almost entirely switched.  The initial vote 
had been six to three for the Hills; it now shifted to seven to two 
against the Hills.  The overblown Fortas opinion, the Black memo, 
and doubts about the statute that had been confirmed at reargument 
had led to a reversal.458 
Chief Justice Warren maintained his vote in favor of the Hills. He 
admitted that the New York law was “not too clear” but that the Court 
should put an end to the lengthy litigation.459  In the statute’s limited 
application to the Life story, which to him was a clear case of “fiction-
alization,” there was no violation of the First Amendment.460  False 
publications had no value as news.461  Fortas held to his original posi-
tion.  Between the first and the second votes, Stewart, Harlan, Bren-
nan and Clark had changed their minds.462  With White, Douglas, and 
Black they would reverse for a new trial in which the jury would be in-
structed to apply the Sullivan rule to the falsity issue.463 
Brennan and Black would have gone as far to strike down the 
statute.464  This might have happened had the New York Court of Ap-
peals not issued its decision, a week later, in Spahn v. Julian Messner, 
Inc., in which it confirmed Nixon’s reading of the privacy statute—
truthful, newsworthy material was privileged even if published for 
“circulation-generating” purposes.465  The Rabin dictum was not a 
correct statement of the law.466  The decision in Spahn led Brennan to 
believe that the statute need not be struck down on its face—New 
 
458 Bernard Schwartz attributed the switch in the votes to the Black memo. My research sug-
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York law respected newsworthy material– but that a new trial was 
needed so the law could be constitutionally applied with a scienter 
requirement.467 
With the Chief Justice no longer in the majority, Black, as the sen-
ior majority justice, assigned the opinion, and he gave it to Bren-
nan.468  “Hugo told me he had assigned five cases Friday.  He evident-
ly got the Court on his Time magazine case!”  Black’s wife noted in 
her diary on Saturday, October 23, 1966, “How he has worked.  Abe 
and the Chief only ones against him.”469 
Brennan issued the first draft of his opinion on December 1, 1966. 
At first, White was the only one to join the opinion.470  Three weeks 
passed; finally, on December 22, Fortas circulated a dissent.  Aware of 
how much he had offended Brennan with his first opinion, he sought 
to make amends.  Fortas sent a copy of his dissent to Brennan with a 
handwritten note:  “Please let me know if any of this bark is too bitey. 
I’ll change it.”471  Warren joined the dissent, and so did Clark, who 
had inexplicably retreated from the majority. 
Harlan circulated an opinion concurring in the judgment but on 
a negligence standard.472  Black and Douglas both circulated opinions 
joining Brennan’s opinion but made clear that they were still com-
mitted to their absolutism.  Stewart then became the deciding vote.  
Brennan lobbied him, and he agreed to reverse.  Brennan had won 
Stewart’s allegiance by adding a paragraph clarifying that the holding 
would apply only to privacy cases, not libel cases involving private per-
sons, which had been a particular concern of Stewart’s.  Stewart wrote 
to Brennan the day after he made this change, agreeing to join Bren-
nan’s opinion.473 
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D.  January 9, 1967 
The 5-4 decision in Time, Inc. v. Hill was issued on January 9, 
1967.474  “We hold that the constitutional protections for speech and 
press preclude the application of the New York statute to redress false 
reports of matters of public interest in the absence of proof that the 
defendant published the report with knowledge of its falsity or in 
reckless disregard of the truth,” the majority concluded.475  The trial 
judge’s charge to the jury had failed to indicate that reckless false-
hood was a prerequisite to liability.476  The Court remanded the case 
to the New York Court of Appeals for a new trial with a proper jury 
instruction.477  Brennan took the law on false and defamatory state-
ments about public officials and applied it to false and 
nondefamatory statements about private citizens connected to non-
political subjects.478  This was a significant extension of Sullivan and, 
as Nixon had argued, not explained by its rationale of avoiding sedi-
tious libel and protecting the public’s right to engage in political crit-
icism. 
In Time, Inc. v. Hill, Brennan extended the realm of First Amend-
ment speech beyond what he had articulated in Sullivan.  Brennan’s 
vision of protected speech in Hill was as expansive as Meiklejohn’s, 
perhaps even more so.479  Time, Inc’s brief on reargument had relied 
on Meiklejohn’s ideas, and as the Columbia Journalism Review noted, 
there were “striking parallels in language between [Brennan’s] opin-
ion and Meiklejohn’s writings.”480  In Hill, Brennan saw a chance to 
extend the First Amendment gains he had made in New York Times, 
and he took the opportunity to announce an expansive terrain of 
protected expression encompassing more than political affairs. 
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“The guarantees for speech and press are not the preserve of po-
litical expression or comment upon public affairs, essential as those 
are to healthy government,” Brennan wrote.481  He quoted a 1941 
case, Thornhill v. Alabama:  “Freedom of discussion, if it would fulfill 
its historic function in this nation, must embrace all issues about 
which information is needed or appropriate to enable the members 
of society to cope with the exigencies of their period.”482  Brennan 
then referenced Winters v. New York, in which the Court had over-
turned the conviction of a bookseller under an “indecent exposure” 
statute for distributing a magazine containing “accounts 
of . . . bloodshed, lust or crime.”  “The line between the informing 
and entertaining [was] too elusive” to make that boundary the test 
for freedom of the press, the Winters Court had concluded.483 
From this followed the Hill opinion’s key passage:  “We have no 
doubt that the subject of the Life article, the opening of a new play 
linked to an [ ] incident, is a matter of public interest.”484  Comic 
books, human-interest stories, gossip, and other less than enlightened 
material—the “vast range of published matter” that appeared in the 
press, however banal—were equally protected by the First Amend-
ment.485  Newsworthy material, as defined by the press, marked the 
ambit of free speech.486  Brennan adopted the most expansive reading 
of the newsworthiness privilege under state privacy law, and went be-
yond it—even false, newsworthy material was protected unless the 
falsehood was “calculated.”487  Outside of the Black/Douglas absolut-
ist position, which had never commanded a majority, Brennan’s de-
scription of protected speech was one of the broadest in First 
Amendment history.488 
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Freedom of the press meant more than protecting political dis-
course and Sullivan’s “citizen critic.”489  Freedom of the press meant 
freeing the press from damage awards, with their chilling effect.  The 
function of the press in a democratic society was to publish on all 
matters of public interest; too-easy liability for invasion of privacy im-
paired its ability to fulfill this duty.490  “We create a grave risk of seri-
ous impairment of the indispensable service of a free press in a free 
society if we saddle the press with the impossible burden of verifying 
to a certainty the facts associated in news articles with a person’s 
name, picture or portrait, particularly as related to nondefamatory 
matter,” Brennan wrote.491  “Erroneous statement” was no less inevi-
table in reporting stories like the Life article than in the case of 
“comment upon [political] affairs,” and a negligence standard did 
not afford “the freedoms of expression . . . the ‘breathing space that 
they need to survive.”492  Quoting to his own opinion in Sullivan, 
Brennan noted that “[f]ear of large verdicts in damage suits for inno-
cent or merely negligent misstatement, even fear of the expense in-
volved in their defense, must inevitably cause publishers to 
‘steer . . . wider of the unlawful zone.’”493 
What about privacy?  Brennan dismissed the Griswold argument by 
ignoring it.  The only mention of privacy in the Hill opinion came in 
a passage that suggested that the Hills should have no expectation of 
privacy, at least when it came to media publicity:  “Exposure of the 
self to others in varying degrees is a concomitant of life in a civilized 
community.  The risk of this exposure is an essential incident of life 
in a society which places a primary value on freedom of speech and of 
press.”494  Although Brennan did not foreclose recovery for the Hills, 
he made clear that the Hills’ non-constitutional privacy could not 
compete against freedom of the press.  In Hill, privacy was not really 
being weighed against freedom of the press; Brennan was jettisoning 
privacy so the press could have freedom to exercise its social and con-
stitutional functions. 
 
popular magazines like Esquire that may have seemed like “trash” to some readers) see al-
so Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 532–33 (1952) (noting that movies and 
other forms of entertainment were encompassed by the First Amendment). 
489 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 282 (1964). 
490 See POWE JR., supra note 230, at 320 (noting that Hill was a “press case[] pure and simple, 
protecting an institution that was vital to the concept of democracy even when it was not 
discussing government affairs”). 
491 Time, Inc., 385 U.S. at 389. 
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Time, Inc. v. Hill, like Sullivan, was a product of its time.  By 1967, 
the cultural upheaval of the era had reached new levels of violence 
and acrimony.  That year, 100,000 marched on the Pentagon to pro-
test the Vietnam War.  Race riots broke out throughout the country.  
Hippies and other countercultural activists experimented with radi-
cal, alternative lifestyles, spawning hateful reactions.  The nightly 
news teemed with images of dissenters assaulted and beaten by au-
thorities.  A political and cultural transformation was underway, and 
the press played a critical role in it.  This was not only through its re-
porting on political affairs.  Publications like Life magazine, merging 
news and entertainment, kept the public abreast of the changes in 
politics, norms, habits, values and lifestyles that were unfolding as the 
nation hurtled deeper into the civil rights movement, the Vietnam 
War, and student dissent.  As the Supreme Court correspondent for 
the Washington Post noted, Hill may well have been informed by the 
Court’s “long-held interest in protecting [free] expression” for civil 
rights and other protest movements.495 
In his concurrence, Black continued to propound his favorite 
themes, rejecting “New York Times’ dilution of First Amendment 
rights” and attacking the “recently popularized weighing and balanc-
ing formula” as a “Constitution-ignoring-and-destroying technique.”496  
“The ‘weighing’ doctrine plainly encourages and actually invites 
judges to choose for themselves between conflicting values, even 
where, as in the First Amendment, the Founders made a choice of 
values, one of which is a free press,” he wrote.497  “Though the Consti-
tution requires that judges swear to obey and enforce it, it is not alto-
gether strange that all judges are not always dead set against constitu-
tional interpretations that expand their powers.”498  Douglas similarly 
expressed concerns about the “chilling effects” of anything less than 
absolute protection for speech.499 
Harlan agreed to reverse but would apply a negligence standard 
on remand.500  Like Fortas, he worried that actual malice did not go 
far enough to protect people like the Hills.501  Public officials were a 
“hardy breed” who had assumed the risk of irresponsible publicity; 
 
495 Smith, supra note 480, at 21.  The demise of the invasion of privacy tort, like the eviscera-
tion of libel in Sullivan, was perhaps “yet another unintended victim of the civil rights 
struggle.”  Id. 
496 Time, Inc., 385 U.S. at 399 (Black, J., dissenting). 
497 Id.  
498 Id.  
499 Id. at 401 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
500 Id. at 409–10 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
501 Id. at 409. 
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private citizens had not.502  While public officials could rebut false and 
injurious statements in the “marketplace of ideas,” the Hills lacked 
access to a public platform and were helpless to defend themselves.503  
The “state interest in encouraging careful checking and preparation 
of published material” was much stronger than in New York Times.504  
“The majority would allow sanctions against such conduct only when 
it is morally culpable.  I insist that it can also be reached when it cre-
ates a severe risk of irremediable harm to individuals involuntarily 
exposed to it and powerless to protect themselves against it.”505  Har-
lan concluded with a warning to the majority of the long-term conse-
quences of extending Sullivan—in relieving the press of even “mini-
mal responsibility” for accuracy, the Times doctrine was “ultimately 
harmful to the [ ] good health of the press itself.  If the New York 
Times case has ushered in such a trend it will prove in its long-range 
impact to have done a disservice to the true values encompassed in 
the freedoms of speech and press.”506 
Fortas’s dissent, joined by Warren and Clark, remained strident.  
“Perhaps the purpose of the [majority] decision [ ] is to indicate that 
this Court will place insuperable obstacles in the way of recovery by 
persons who are injured by reckless and heedless assaults provided 
they are in print, and even though they are [ ] divorced from fact,” 
he wrote.507  He chafed against Brennan’s broad newsworthiness con-
cept and maintained that the Life piece was not a “matter of [ ] public 
interest”; the publication “irresponsibly and injuriously invade[d] the 
privacy of a quiet family for no purpose except dramatic interest and 
commercial appeal.”508  Having no relevance to the functions of self-
governance, the Life article was not part of the “specially protected 
core” of the First Amendment. 509  “I do not believe that the First 
Amendment precludes effective protection of the right of privacy—or 
for that matter, an effective law of libel.  I do not believe that we must 
or should . . . strike down all state action . . . which penalizes the use 
of words as instruments of aggression and personal assault.”510 
Fortas denounced the Griswold Court for retrenching on the value 
of privacy.  “The Court today does not repeat the ringing words of so 
 
502 Id. at  408–09. 
503 Id. at 409. 
504 Id. at 408. 
505 Id. at 410. 
506 Id. at 410–11. 
507 Id. at 411 (Fortas, J., dissenting). 
508 Id. at 415. 
509 Id. at 420. 
510 Id. at 412. 
580 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 18:2 
 
many of its members on so many occasions in exaltation of the right 
of privacy.  Instead, it reverses a decision under the New York ‘Right 
of Privacy’ statute” because of a minor technicality.511  Fortas accused 
the majority of using the jury instruction as an excuse to adopt an ab-
solutist position without coming out and saying so.512  The “net effect” 
of the decision was not only an “individual injustice, but an encour-
agement to recklessness and careless readiness to ride roughshod 
over the interests of others.”513   
For this Court totally to immunize the press . . . in areas far beyond the 
needs of news, comment on public persons and events, discussion of pub-
lic issues and the like would be no service to freedom of the press, but an 
invitation to public hostility to that freedom . . . . This Court cannot and 
should not refuse to permit under state law the private citizen who is ag-
grieved by the type of assault which we have here and which is not within 
the specially protected core of the First Amendment to recover compen-
satory damages for recklessly inflicted invasion of his rights.514 
Fortas expressed concerns about the well-being of the Hills, who 
had litigated the case for 11 years and were now about to be put 
through the burden of a new trial with no apparent justification.515  
That trial never came to pass.  Shortly after the Court’s decision, 
Time, Inc. settled with James Hill.  The amount of the settlement was 
not a part of the public record; it appears in a memo that Garment 
wrote to Nixon and that has been preserved in Nixon’s papers.  “The 
Hill case is settled,” Garment wrote to Nixon.  “Time, Inc. has agreed 
to pay $75,000 (in addition to the $60,000 previously paid to settle 
Mrs. Hill’s claim).  Jim Hill is gratified with this outcome and relieved 
that another trial is avoided. Medina is likewise relieved.  I think this 
is an honorable settlement, and, under the circumstances, a sensible 
step for all concerned.”516 
Even this could not compensate the Hills for their loss.  In the af-
termath of the Life article, Elizabeth Hill descended into mental ill-
ness.517  She struggled with severe depression and self-destructive 
thoughts and for over a decade maintained a course of psychothera-
py, medications, and electric shock treatments.518  A few years after 
the Supreme Court’s decision, Elizabeth Hill committed suicide.519 
 
511 Id. at 416. 
512 Id. at 416–17. 
513 Id. at 420. 
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515 Id. at 411. 
516 Letter from Leonard Garment to Richard Nixon (May 18, 1967) (on file with author). 
517 Garment, supra note 5, at 109. 
518 Id. 
519 Id. 
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VIII.  AFTERMATH 
Time, Inc. v. Hill had significant and enduring consequences.  Hill 
constitutionalized the privacy tort, limiting liability for 
nondefamatory portrayals in the press.  Brennan’s majority opinion 
announced a sweeping vision of the First Amendment as protection 
for all newsworthy material.  The press had an obligation to publish 
widely, on all “matters of public interest”—to inform and amuse, titil-
late and educate, and generate discourse on an array of issues and 
subjects, even if personal privacy was injured in the process. 
Time, Inc. v. Hill was the first Supreme Court case to address the 
privacy-free press conflict, but it did not resolve it.  It was the consen-
sus of public opinion that the majority had not only gotten it wrong, 
but that it had given short shrift to an issue that deserved more atten-
tion and reasoned consideration.  By refusing to engage with privacy 
and the Griswold argument, the Court angered many observers, and 
the decision deepened popular concerns with the disappearance of 
privacy.  After Griswold, Mapp v. Ohio, and the Warren Court’s many 
other privacy-protecting decisions, Americans had come to see the 
Warren Court as a defender of personal privacy against powerful and 
unjust social forces.  Hill failed that expectation and left many feeling 
disappointed and betrayed. 
Time, Inc. v. Hill represented a lost opportunity for the Court.  For 
reasons we have seen, the Court missed the chance to seriously con-
template the rights of private persons against the press, whether and 
how ordinary people should be able to use the law to protect them-
selves against unwanted and injurious media publicity.  The convo-
luted New York statute, which conditioned liability on commercialism 
and falsity, obscured the privacy issue in the case.  Personal animus 
also colored the Court’s deliberations—Black’s dislike of Fortas, and 
Fortas’s dislike of the press.  The outcome in Hill was further compli-
cated by the legal confusion around Griswold and Nixon and Fortas’s 
perhaps unwise attempts to build their case on that disputed, shaky 
privacy right.  The timing of the case most distorted it.  Coming only 
a year after Sullivan, at a time when Sullivan’s implications concerned 
the Justices, it was not surprising that Hill would be cast in the shadow 
of Sullivan and that the Court would try to shoehorn its very different 
issues into the New York Times framework. 
Harry Kalven, Jr. thought that the Court was “handicapped” by 
timing.520  “Hill was a curiously difficult case to handle so soon after 
 
520 Kalven, Jr., supra note 480, at 286. 
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New York Times,” he wrote shortly after the decision.521  Leonard Gar-
ment also believed that the case might have gone the other way if 
Time, Inc. had not appealed when it did.  “Might the Hill decision 
have been affirmed if Time’s appeal to the Supreme Court had not 
followed so quickly on the heels of Sullivan and the surrounding pro-
press enthusiasm of the public and the courts?” he wrote in a 1989 
New Yorker article.522 
What might things have been like if the case reached the Court a 
few years later?  What would have happened if Fortas had written his 
opinion in a more temperate tone?  Might there have been a consti-
tutional right against unwanted publicity?  When would that right 
cede to the right of free speech?  As Garment wrote in the New Yorker, 
the case left him with a “permanent collection of what-ifs.”523  Me too.  
What we do know is that things could have easily gone the other way, 
and that a constitutional right to privacy against the press, as Nixon 
and Fortas envisioned it, would have had no small impact on publish-
ing, politics and public discourse. 
*** 
Like many of the Warren Court’s civil liberties cases, Time, Inc. v. 
Hill was “enveloped by controversy.”524  The proceedings in the case 
had been watched avidly by the press and the public; in the days after 
the decision, almost all of the major media outlets reported on it, and 
some on the front page.  “The Supreme Court ruled . . . that ‘news-
worthy’ persons, including those who do not seek publicity, have only 
a limited right to sue for damages for false reports that are published 
about them,” wrote the Washington Post the day after the decision.525  
The opinion substantially “extends the guarantee of freedom of the 
press established by the Constitution,” noted the Hartford Courant.526  
The New York Times ran the entire opinion under the headline, “Su-
preme Court Supports Press on A Privacy Issue,” as well as an editori-
 
521 Id. 
522 GARMENT, supra note 5, at 109. 
523 Id. 
524 Smith, supra note 480, at 20. 
525 John P. MacKenzie, Court Restricts Newsworthy People in Damage Suits over False Reports, 
WASH. POST, Jan. 10, 1967, at A1. 
526 Privacy and Press, HARTFORD COURANT, Jan. 12, 1967, at 14. “The press does not seek the 
privilege of prying inordinately. But it does cherish the responsibility of being able to in-
form. Today more and more attempts are being made to hedge that responsibility round-
about. It is healthy and helpful not only to the press but the public when the Supreme 
Court clarifies issues as well as it did in this instance.”  Id. 
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al in which it praised Brennan for giving the press “breathing room” 
to “inform and criticize.”527  In a shamelessly self-congratulatory move, 
Time magazine published a piece titled “A Vote for the Press Over 
Privacy” in which it speculated that the ruling would eliminate many 
of the “nuisance” libel and privacy suits filed against it each year.528  
The President of Time, Inc. issued a public statement celebrating the 
Court for upholding the vital principle of a free press.529 
While the press celebrated Brennan, Nixon prevailed in the court 
of public opinion.  Popular reactions to the decision were almost 
wholly unfavorable.  Time, Inc. v. Hill unleashed criticism in law re-
views, academic journals, and popular publications.530  As the New York 
Times noted, the Hill decision was “bound to disturb . . . Americans” 
at a time “when . . . circumscriptions on privacy are already omni-
present.”531  The Court had “cavalierly undercut a basic right—an ac-
tion especially disturbing to many observers because it comes at a 
time when privacy is being increasingly threatened in a ‘naked socie-
ty.’”532  The decision came down in an era of heightened sensitivity to 
privacy, and also against the backdrop of press criticism.  With the 
rise of investigative journalism and bold coverage of Vietnam, civil 
rights, and anti-government protest, the media had become a major, 
opinionated force in political and social affairs.  While many support-
ed the press’s powerful voice, there was also a feeling that media insti-
tutions were abusing their authority, engaging in needless sensation-
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alism, taking dangerous liberties with the truth, and running rough-
shod over privacy.533 
Leonard Garment believed that Americans saw the Hill decision as 
an example of the “arrogance of journalists and intellectual elites in 
riding heedless over the interests and values of more ordinary folk.”534  
“To pardon the invasion of privacy of [James Hill]” “is to allow the 
massed power of the media to run unchecked against isolated and 
helpless individuals,” wrote one law professor.535  “Are we here simply, 
or largely, as spectators to be regaled and entertained by the misfor-
tunes of our fellows as reported by the media of information, marvel-
ous in their technological accomplishment?” asked legal scholar 
Willard Pedrick.536  “Are the tragedy and heartbreak of individuals, 
who have sought no role in the direction of our society, to be the 
stuff served up to beguile the rest of us?”537  The consequence of re-
quiring private figures to prove actual malice, observed the Texas Law 
Review, was that “the press will be insulated from responsibility for the 
harms inflicted upon innocent persons.”538  “The fact that what alleg-
edly happened to the Hill family was news should not in the name of 
the first amendment justify an obliteration of society’s commitment 
to the values of privacy,” wrote Melville Nimmer.539  “By finding a con-
stitutionally protectable right to privacy which could be balanced 
against rights of speech and press, the Court could have [pre-
served] . . . the true value of both rights,” noted one law review.540  
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“[T]he preservation of innocent citizens’ peace and happiness may 
merit such protection.”541 
Many were critical of Brennan’s extension and seeming misappli-
cation of the Sullivan rule.  The Court’s attempts to articulate “a co-
herent theory of the value of free speech” in Sullivan—“eloquently 
described precepts derived from the concept of self-government”—
had “dissipated into a collection of vague and unsupported asser-
tions,” in the opinion of one law professor.542  “[T]he Court in Time 
retreated to some vague notion of ‘public interest.’”543  “However ab-
solute the freedoms of press and speech may be, the political settings 
in New York Times . . . presented a much greater need for free speech 
than did Hill.”544  Hill’s definition of newsworthy speech was seemingly 
so open-ended that it could cover just about anything.545  “More than 
two years after their brief and highly unwelcome moment in the pub-
lic eye, the Hill family was a ‘matter of public interest’ only because of 
the very Life magazine article about which they complained,” ob-
served the Harvard Law Review.546  “[T]he Court’s tests . . . make the 
press the arbiter of its own constitutional protection:  by the very act 
of printing an article sufficiently sensational to arouse public interest, 
the press . . . insulate[s] itself from liability.”547  “[T]he logic of New 
York Times and Hill taken together grants the press some measure of 
constitutional protection for anything the press thinks is a matter of 
public interest.”548  In the view of some critics, the Court seemed to 
have unleashed the possibility of the complete takeover of public dis-
course by the press. 
*** 
Time, Inc. v. Hill’s effects on the law were immediately felt.  By the 
early 1970s, the decision had “touched a wide variety of cases, includ-
ing cases involving false statements and those involving true state-
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ments,” observed two professors in the Washington Law Review.549  Hill 
limited liability for fictionalized invasions of privacy under the New 
York statute, and also common law privacy cases involving the publi-
cation of truthful private facts.  Just as Time, Inc. v. Hill had made the 
public aware of the importance of legal protections for privacy, it sen-
sitized judges throughout the country to the First Amendment impli-
cations of privacy actions involving the media. 
Although Hill’s holding was limited to cases under the New York 
privacy statute, by describing newsworthiness as a category of consti-
tutional proportion, the Court strengthened the news privilege in 
common law privacy cases.  In the first few years after the decision, 
state courts deemed a wide array of material to be newsworthy and 
exempt from liability for invasion of privacy.  An article about two 
children trapped in a refrigerator and suffocated was described as a 
matter of public concern, as was a story in the National Enquirer maga-
zine about a murder-suicide, and an article in Detective Publications 
magazine about a murder entitled “House of Horror.”550  The news-
worthiness privilege has become so expansive since Hill that the tort 
is today nearly moribund.  Scholars have written “requiems” to the 
private facts tort, even describing it as “dead.”551  Hill’s actual malice 
rule was also applied to the falsity requirement in “false light privacy” 
cases.  The Supreme Court used Hill’s reckless disregard standard in 
its first false light case, Cantrell v. Forest City Publishing.552 
 
549 Pember & Teeter, Jr., supra note 96, at 65; see also Kellogg, supra note 530, at 747 (“Hill 
seems likely to limit considerably the future usefulness of ‘privacy’ as a tort.”). 
550 Cordell v. Detective Publ’ns, 419 F.2d 989 (6th Cir. 1969); Varnish v. Best Medium Publ’g 
Co., 405 F.2d 608, 611 (2d Cir. 1968); Costlow v. Cusimano, 34 A.D. 2d 196, 198 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 1970) . 
551 See Samantha Barbas, Death of the Public Disclosure Tort:  A Historical Perspective, 22 YALE J. 
LAW & HUMAN. 171, 172 (2010); Jonathan B. Mintz, The Remains of Privacy’s Disclosure Tort:  
An Exploration of the Private Domain, 55 MD. L. REV. 425, 426 (1996) (“[M]ost of privacy ac-
ademia have pronounced dead the more than century-old tort of public disclosure of pri-
vate facts.”); Diane L. Zimmerman, Requiem for a Heavyweight:  A Farewell to Warren and 
Brandeis’s Privacy Tort, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 291, 294 (1983).  In Hill, the Court has heard 
only a few cases involving the disclosure of private facts; in them, the Court decided for 
the press but limited its holdings, reserving judgment on the broader question of whether 
the publication of truthful material can ever be subject to liability consistent with the First 
Amendment.  Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 535 (2001) (focusing on the specific in-
quiry at issue of whether “a stranger’s illegal conduct . . . suffice[s] to remove the First 
Amendment shield from speech about a matter of public concern”); Cox Broad. Corp. v. 
Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 491 (1975) (declining to address the broad question of whether the 
State may carve out an area of privacy while still acting consistently with the First 
Amendment, and instead focusing on a narrower issue involving the relationship between 
the press and privacy). 
552 Cantrell v. Forest City Publ’g, 419 U.S. 245, 252 (1974) (concluding that the District 
Judge’s application of the “actual malice” standard articulated in Hill was correct). 
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Hill also influenced the law of libel. In the first few years after the 
decision, several lower courts read Hill, erroneously, to apply the Sul-
livan standard to libelous statements on any “matter of public con-
cern.”553  Technically, Hill did not affect libel; Sullivan and two cases 
decided the same term as Hill, Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts and Associ-
ated Press v. Walker, confirmed that the malice privilege in libel cases 
depended on the status of the plaintiff rather than the subject of the 
publication.554  The media could take advantage of the “reckless dis-
regard” standard only in libel cases involving public officials or “pub-
lic figures” involved in “public affairs.”555 
In 1971, however, the Court brought reputation into parity with 
privacy.  Extending Hill to the libel context, in Rosenbloom v. Metrome-
dia, Inc., an opinion by Justice Brennan held that the actual malice 
standard applied whenever the subject matter of the libel was a “mat-
ter . . . of public or general interest.”556  “If a matter is a subject of 
public or general interest, it cannot suddenly become less so merely 
because a private individual is involved, or because in some sense the 
individual did not ‘voluntarily’ choose to become involved,” he 
wrote.557  Yet three years later, in Gertz v. Robert Welch, the Court re-
turned to the “status of the plaintiff” approach in defamation cases.  
Concluding that private persons, unlike public persons, have not vol-
untarily exposed themselves to enhanced risk of injury from defama-
tory falsehoods, Gertz adopted a minimum requirement of negligence 
for compensatory damages in libel cases involving private citizens.558  
Brennan dissented in Gertz, insisting that the proper accommodation 
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between “avoidance of media self-censorship and protection of indi-
vidual reputations” demanded that the Sullivan standard apply to li-
bel actions “concerning media reports of the involvement of private 
individuals in events of public or general interest.”559  After Gertz, 
some courts continued to apply Hill to the falsity requirement in 
“false light” privacy cases involving private figures, while others ap-
plied Gertz.560  This latter approach, acknowledging a distinction in li-
ability rules between public and private figures, essentially made Har-
lan’s position in Hill governing law. 
Since Hill, the Court has used the newsworthiness or “matters of 
public interest” concept to protect a range of speech in a variety of 
cases and contexts.561  In Pickering v. Board of Education, a majority held 
that a public school teacher had a right to speak on issues of “public 
concern” without being dismissed unless knowing or reckless false-
hood could be shown.562  In Connick v. Myers, the Court indicated that 
the “matters of public concern” standard used to judge public em-
ployee speech was the same as in Hill.563  A matter of “public concern 
is something that is a subject of . . . general interest and of value and 
concern to the public at the time of publication.”564  More recently, 
“matters of public concern” was invoked by the majority in its deci-
sion for the Westboro Baptist Church in the 2011 case Snyder v. 
Phelps.565  The Court concluded that the Church’s anti-gay funeral 
 
559 Id. at 361 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
560 On the uncertainty around this issue, see Justice Powell’s concurring opinion in Cox 
Broad. Corp, 420 U.S. at 498, n.2 (noting that courts’ application of Gertz “calls into ques-
tion the conceptual basis of Time, Inc. v. Hill”) and Justice Stewart’s remarks in Cantrell, 
419 U.S. at 250–51 (declining to resolve whether the Court’s standard in Hill applied to 
all false-light cases).  Section 652E of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1977) retains 
the Hill approach. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E (1977) (providing that a 
person who casts another in a false light, by means of publicity, is liable if that person had 
knowledge of or acted in reckless disregard as to the falsity of the matter). 
561 Cynthia L. Estlund, Speech on Matters of Public Concern:  The Perils of an Emerging First 
Amendment Category, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 1 (1990). 
562 Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 574 (1968) (holding that a teacher could not be 
terminated in the absence of proof that he had made false statements knowingly or reck-
lessly). 
563 See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 143 n.5 (1983) (citing Hill for the purposes of ex-
plaining the standard used to determine whether a matter is of “legitimate concern to the 
public”).  When a majority upheld the firing of an assistant district attorney in Connick for 
circulating a questionnaire on co-workers’ attitudes towards employment policies, Justice 
Brennan dissented, stating that the majority had defined “public concern” too narrowly:  
“[t]he Court’s narrow conception of which matters are of public interest 
is . . . inconsistent with the broad view of that concept articulated in our cases dealing 
with the constitutional limits on liability for invasion of privacy.”  Id. at 165 n.5. 
564 City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 83–84 (2004). 
565 131 S. Ct. 1207 (2011). 
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picketing, however hateful, involved speech that could be “fairly con-
sidered as relating to any matter of political, social, or other concern 
to the community,” that was “a subject of legitimate news interest.”566 
*** 
In helping free the media from liability in invasion of privacy ac-
tions, Hill, like Sullivan, emboldened the press.  While the increase in 
media sensationalism in the past fifty years has many causes beyond 
the Supreme Court’s decisions, legal scholars and media commenta-
tors have suggested that that the law’s expanding protections for the 
press—Sullivan and its “progeny”—encouraged greater risk-taking 
among journalists, both for good and for ill.567  In Leonard Garment’s 
view, Hill led journalists to believe that the “First Amendment’s writ 
ran without limit.”568  Had the Hill decision gone the other way, one 
lawyer opined, “the excessive tabloidism of the 1980s and 1990s” 
might have been stemmed.569 
One of the most eminent observers of the law and the press, the 
New York Times’ Supreme Court journalist Anthony Lewis, attributed 
the media’s cavalier attitudes towards privacy, in part, to Time, Inc. v. 
Hill.  For decades, Lewis, a noted free speech advocate, wrote and 
spoke extensively about the case, maintaining that the decision was 
wrong; “if your life is ruined by the press, you should have some kind 
of recourse,” he told a public audience in 2008.570  As Lewis wrote in 
1997, Brennan’s tacit dismissal of privacy was just too simple.  “In a 
world that has known Orwell’s Big Brother, and that now lives with 
electronic networks tracking our lives, many would resist the proposi-
 
566 Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1216. 
567 See William P. Marshall & Susan Gilles, The Supreme Court, the First Amendment, and Bad 
Journalism, 1994 SUP. CT. REV. 169, 207 (“[T]he Court has created a jurisprudence that 
too often encourages a trivial, lax, and sensationalistic press over a press that is devoted to 
the thorough and accurate investigation and reporting of matters of public import.”); see 
also Gerald G. Ashdown, Journalism Police, 89 MARQ. L. REV. 739 (2006) (discussing the 
press’s immunity from accountability in light of Sullivan and its progeny). 
568 GARMENT, supra note 5, at 110. 
569 ROBERT ELLIS SMITH, BEN FRANKLIN’S WEB SITE:  PRIVACY AND CURIOSITY FROM PLYMOUTH 
ROCK TO THE INTERNET 252 (2004). 
570 Midwinter Meeting, AM. LIBRARIES (2008).  What did James Hill, a private person, have to 
do with the reason of New York Times v. Sullivan . . . and its lesson that the central mean-
ing of the First Amendment is the right to criticize those who govern us?  My answer is—
nothing. I think the Court, in Time, Inc. v. Hill, applied the compelling logic of Sullivan in 
a situation where it was quite inapposite.  See Anthony Lewis, The Sullivan Decision, 1 TENN. 
J. L. & POL’Y 135, 148 (2004); see also LEWIS, supra note 5, at 184–85 (distinguishing Hill 
from Sullivan). 
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tion that ‘exposure of the self to others’ is a necessary part of living in 
a ‘civilized community.’”571 
*** 
For Earl Warren, Time, Inc. Hill represented a failure.  Warren had 
long believed in the importance of curbing certain kinds of harmful 
speech, such as obscenity, in the interest of the social good, and he 
was disturbed that he had been unable to persuade the Court to fol-
low his views in Hill.572  Fortas also remained bitter about the case. 
Many years later, he told Leonard Garment that no case during his 
time on the Court had affected him so much, or so offended his 
sense of justice.573  “It was a bad result, and terribly unfair to the Hill 
family.  I offer you my apologies for not being more effective,” Fortas 
said to Garment.574 
Hill cursed Fortas in other ways.  In 1968, Warren was resigning, 
and a departing President Johnson had tried to put Fortas in the po-
sition to avoid the possibility of a Nixon appointment.575  But Fortas 
was undone by a series of financial scandals, fueled in part by an arti-
cle in Life exposing a secret fee he had accepted from a corrupt fi-
nancier—said to be payback for his position in Hill.576  Fortas resigned 
from the Court amidst scandal, and President Nixon appointed War-
ren Burger Chief Justice.577  In 1969, on the last day Warren appeared 
on the Court before his retirement, Nixon gave an unprecedented 
address to the Court by a sitting president.578  He joked that based on 
his arguments before the Court in Hill, the only thing more harrow-
ing than a presidential press conference was an argument before the 
Supreme Court.579 
 
571 Anthony Lewis, The Press:  Free But Not Exceptional, in REASON AND PASSION:  JUSTICE 
BRENNAN’S ENDURING INFLUENCE 58 (E. Joshua Rosenkranz & Bernard Schwartz eds., 
1997). 
572 NEWTON, supra note 358, at 477. 
573 To Warren and Fortas, Garment observed, the case was not so much about free speech or 
privacy as it was about “nontechnical justice—two ordinary American parents touched by 
near-tragedy and trying to shield themselves and their five young children from the 
cheapening effects of unwanted and distorted publicity.”  GARMENT, supra note 5, at 109. 
574 Id. at 107. 
575 See BOB WOODWARD & SCOTT ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN:  INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT 
10 (1979). 
576 KALMAN, supra note 365, at 361–62. 
577 GARMENT, supra note 5, at 109. 
578 Graham, supra note 350, at 178. 
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Despite the Court’s unfavorable judgment in Hill, the case em-
boldened Nixon.  The praise he won for his oral argument was em-
powering and encouraging to him.  According to a biographer, “Nix-
on’s appearance before the Supreme Court marked the zenith of his 
legal career.  In his own mind he had now proved himself on the fast 
track of the New York bar.  This made him feel ready to return to the 
even faster track of national politics.”580  Although Nixon and his im-
promptu “campaign team” at Mudge had been laying the foundations 
for a presidential run since 1965, Nixon, chronically insecure, re-
mained doubtful about his prospects.  Hill helped him find the con-
fidence he needed to announce his 1968 presidential bid.  One of the 
major themes in Nixon’s campaign was his opposition to the Warren 
Court, especially Earl Warren, whom he criticized for his liberal 
stance on civil rights and civil liberties.  Nixon famously accused War-
ren of “coddling criminals.”581  In 1968 Nixon won a narrow victory 
over Hubert Humphrey, carrying 32 states.582 
Right after the decision in Hill, Nixon had told reporters that he 
was “pleased” that the Court had upheld the privacy statute.  “From 
this standpoint,” he said, “the court’s decision is a historic vindication 
of fundamental rights of the individual as against abuses of freedom 
of the press.”583  In reality, he was outraged and offended by the deci-
sion.  Nixon felt he had lost his “war” on the press.  As he said to 
Garment, “I always knew I wouldn’t be permitted to win . . . against 
the press.”584  Nixon told Garment that he “never want[ed] to hear 
about the Hill case again.”585  Because the draft opinions and corre-
spondence between the Justices were not made public until the 
1980s, Nixon didn’t know that he almost won the case.586 
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